OT: He's gone.

Epetruk

Simon Brooke wrote:
> in message <32dgacF3itl49U1@individual.net>, Epetruk
> ('nobody@blackhole.com') wrote:
>
>> I don't see the value of ID cards as a terrorist prevention measure -
>> quite frankly, I can't understand that argument. To me, they are more
>> valuable in preventing identity theft (which I believe is going to
>> be a big issue in the future) and benefit fraud.
>
> Surely they _enable_ identity theft? If I steal your ID card, how are
> you going to prove you're you and I'm not?

> Especially if I have the technology to write my biometric information
> to it, which sooner or later organised criminals will have.

Well, as I said earlier, I don't believe that any solution will completely
_eliminate_ identity theft - however, I believe that biometric ID cards
will eventually help to reduce it. I certainly don't see how the current
means of establishing my identity makes it more difficult for people to
steal my identity than if I added biometric ID cards to the mix.

If someone steals my biometric ID card and put their biometrics on the card,
this may not be enough. For example, the issuer of the card could encrypt
the biometric information on the card using two different private keys
that are available only to the issuing organisation, and the card readers
would use the public key of the issuer to decrypt the information before
it could be verified against the biometrics of the card holder. The
challenge
for the forger is now to get hold of these private keys - not impossible,
but very difficult.

--
Akin

aknak at aksoto dot idps dot co dot uk

garryb59

On Wed, 15 Dec 2004 23:54:34 +0000, Jon Senior
<jon_AT_restlesslemon_DOT_co_DOT_uk> wrote:

>Sorry but I haven't been this happy about politics in years. Herr
>Blunkett has left the building. I would wish him my condolences if I
>actually felt that he was in any way qualified to hold the position of
>Home Secretary in the first place. Let's hope the milder Clarke sweeps
>his more rabid policies under the carpet.
>

What I like about David Blunkett, unlike a lot of other MPs, is that,
because of the nature of his personality, he invites you to either
like him or dislike him. Opinions elicit opinions.

Where he is right now emotionally is not a place you want to be with a
job like that. Blimey. Stress city. Better off out of it.

I like him, and I like the way he does business.

Hey ho...


Garry

Michael MacClancy

On Thu, 16 Dec 2004 21:10:12 +0000, Simon Brooke wrote:


>
> What is our business is when someone abuses their public office to
> favour particular individuals, or when someone imprisons someone else
> without recourse to due process.
>
> There's no doubt in my mind that Blunkett should have gone, but I'm not
> at all convinced that the reason he went is the reason he should have
> gone.

But he did. The reason he went is that he abused his public office, didn't
he?
--
Michael MacClancy

www.macclancy.demon.co.uk
www.macclancy.co.uk

Trevor Barton

Epetruk wrote:
> Simon Brooke wrote:
>
>>in message <32dgacF3itl49U1@individual.net>, Epetruk
>>('nobody@blackhole.com') wrote:
>>
>>
>>>I don't see the value of ID cards as a terrorist prevention measure -
>>>quite frankly, I can't understand that argument. To me, they are more
>>>valuable in preventing identity theft (which I believe is going to
>>>be a big issue in the future) and benefit fraud.
>>
>>Surely they _enable_ identity theft? If I steal your ID card, how are
>>you going to prove you're you and I'm not?
>
>
>>Especially if I have the technology to write my biometric information
>>to it, which sooner or later organised criminals will have.
>
>
> Well, as I said earlier, I don't believe that any solution will completely
> _eliminate_ identity theft - however, I believe that biometric ID cards
> will eventually help to reduce it. I certainly don't see how the current
> means of establishing my identity makes it more difficult for people to
> steal my identity than if I added biometric ID cards to the mix.
>
> If someone steals my biometric ID card and put their biometrics on the card,
> this may not be enough. For example, the issuer of the card could encrypt
> the biometric information on the card using two different private keys
> that are available only to the issuing organisation, and the card readers
> would use the public key of the issuer to decrypt the information before
> it could be verified against the biometrics of the card holder. The
> challenge
> for the forger is now to get hold of these private keys - not impossible,
> but very difficult.

Which, as I said before, makes the cards more valuable, and therefore
more desirable to forge. "Give me your card and your two private
keys, or I'll kill you.". "Oh No, they're so valuable you'll have
to kill me before you get them". I don't think so.

--
Trevor Barton

Call me Bob

On Thu, 16 Dec 2004 23:04:18 +0000, Michael MacClancy
<herzel@nospamo2.co.uk> wrote:

>> There's no doubt in my mind that Blunkett should have gone, but I'm not
>> at all convinced that the reason he went is the reason he should have
>> gone.
>
>But he did. The reason he went is that he abused his public office, didn't
>he?

No, the reason he went is that he got /caught/ abusing his public
office. Most of them get away with it.

--

Call me "Bob"

"More oneness, less categories,
Open hearts, no strategies"

Email address is spam trapped, to reply directly remove the beverage.

Jon Senior

Epetruk wrote:
> Well, as I said earlier, I don't believe that any solution will completely
> _eliminate_ identity theft - however, I believe that biometric ID cards
> will eventually help to reduce it. I certainly don't see how the current
> means of establishing my identity makes it more difficult for people to
> steal my identity than if I added biometric ID cards to the mix.

The problem is this. Currently it is relatively difficult to prove your
identity (requires numerous documents). If an ID card is designed to
conclusively IDentify you (And they are completely worthless if they
don't!) then if I can obtain a false ID card, it will be accepted
without question.

So... how would I obtain a false one? Well, I could spend thousands on
pounds on the technology to produce them and try and create a replica
that looked genuine. Or I could pay the a few thousand to the £12,000 a
year clerk who's job it is to stamp the approved forms. This is the
system used to obtain "fake" passports now.

> If someone steals my biometric ID card and put their biometrics on the card,
> this may not be enough. For example, the issuer of the card could encrypt
> the biometric information on the card using two different private keys
> that are available only to the issuing organisation, and the card readers
> would use the public key of the issuer to decrypt the information before
> it could be verified against the biometrics of the card holder. The
> challenge
> for the forger is now to get hold of these private keys - not impossible,
> but very difficult.

See above. A chain is only as strong as it's weakest link. An offer of
cash to a low-paid clerk in the chain will buy you a card (Or possibly a
"private" key.).

Above and beyond all of this... there is a minor problem with abuse of
the power to request the card (Make no mistakes, if they are introduced
at all, this power will come about). My parents have witnessed that
abuse first hand from the police in Belgium. This is one route that we
do _not_ want to go down.

Jon

Jon Senior

Simon Brooke wrote:
> So, yes, it's good to hear that one of Tony's cronies has got his well
> earned comeuppance. But don't for a moment imagine that, in the words
> of the old song, 'things can only get better'. In the words of another,
> 'you ain't seen nothing yet'.

The sad truth is you're probably right. Judging by the headlines it will
indeed be more of the same. Perhaps it's almost time to invest in that
high power rifle! ;-)

Jon

Nick Kew

In article <Xns95C18BAD62906pleasegivegenerously@130.133.1.4>,
Mark Thompson <pleasegivegenerously@warmmail.com> writes:
>> On social justice, the
>> disparity between rich and poor is wider, and getting wider faster.
>
> As long as the poor are still getting richer that's fine by me.

FSVO "the poor".

> And hey, at least it's the kind-of meaningless 'relative' poverty we're
> concerned about, rather than real poverty.

This country is fixated on income as a measure of prosperity. At the
poorer end this is just plain wrong: the major determining factor is
housing and housing costs. If you can get the notional minimum of
fifty-something quid a week *plus housing* for a single person (or
family equivalents) then you're comfortably off. If you can't, tough.
And these days you disqualify yourself from that bare minimum very
easily: for example if you try to help yourself out of poverty by
running a business, or do voluntary work helping other people.

--
Nick Kew

Epetruk

Jon Senior wrote:
> Epetruk wrote:
>> Well, as I said earlier, I don't believe that any solution will
>> completely _eliminate_ identity theft - however, I believe that
>> biometric ID cards will eventually help to reduce it. I certainly
>> don't see how the current means of establishing my identity makes it
>> more difficult for people to steal my identity than if I added
>> biometric ID cards to the mix.
>
> The problem is this. Currently it is relatively difficult to prove
> your identity (requires numerous documents). If an ID card is
> designed to conclusively IDentify you (And they are completely
> worthless if they don't!)

Why are they worthless if they don't conclusively identify you?
Like I've said throughout this thread, it is *impossible* to achieve
100% conclusive identification - the advantage I see in ID cards is
that they offer a stronger proof that you are who you say you are
(in addition to existing evidence).

> then if I can obtain a false ID card, it will be accepted without
question.

Well, I've also said elsewhere that this shouldn't be the case.

> So... how would I obtain a false one? Well, I could spend thousands on
> pounds on the technology to produce them and try and create a replica
> that looked genuine. Or I could pay the a few thousand to the £12,000
> a year clerk who's job it is to stamp the approved forms. This is the
> system used to obtain "fake" passports now.

Well, a well designed system shouldn't give too much power to a single
individual to make these decisions - the system could be such that
two different people make a check on the documents sent in to prove
your identity. As to how easy it will be to get the technology to
produce fake ID cards, I'm agnostic on this - I won't make assumptions
as to what future technology is and isn't capable of.

But your position looks less like "ID cards are good, but these are the
problems - I wish we could solve them" and more like "ID cards are bad,
and we shouldn't waste our time having them because these are the
problems". If your opposition to ID cards is deeper than the
logistics, then there may not be much point in carrying on this discussion,
as I have often found
that where issues raise deep feelings in people, it may not be a good
idea to argue to much about them.

Michael MacClancy

On Thu, 16 Dec 2004 23:49:02 GMT, Call me Bob wrote:

> On Thu, 16 Dec 2004 23:04:18 +0000, Michael MacClancy
> <herzel@nospamo2.co.uk> wrote:
>
>>> There's no doubt in my mind that Blunkett should have gone, but I'm not
>>> at all convinced that the reason he went is the reason he should have
>>> gone.
>>
>>But he did. The reason he went is that he abused his public office, didn't
>>he?
>
> No, the reason he went is that he got /caught/ abusing his public
> office. Most of them get away with it.

I'm not such a cynic but you may be right. ;-)
--
Michael MacClancy

www.macclancy.demon.co.uk
www.macclancy.co.uk

Simon Brooke

in message <1uj5e87gdbyqf$.1t5ud5ix7drtr.dlg@40tude.net>, Michael
MacClancy ('herzel@nospamo2.co.uk') wrote:

> On Thu, 16 Dec 2004 21:10:12 +0000, Simon Brooke wrote:
>
>> What is our business is when someone abuses their public office to
>> favour particular individuals, or when someone imprisons someone else
>> without recourse to due process.
>>
>> There's no doubt in my mind that Blunkett should have gone, but I'm
>> not at all convinced that the reason he went is the reason he should
>> have gone.
>
> But he did. The reason he went is that he abused his public office,
> didn't he?

I don't believe he would have gone if he had not also insulted all his
cabinet colleagues. I believe they would have tolerated his abuse of
office, but they would not tolerate his abuse of _them_.

--
simon@jasmine.org.uk (Simon Brooke) http://www.jasmine.org.uk/~simon/
"This young man has not the faintest idea how socialists think and does
not begin to understand the mentality of the party he has been elected
to lead. He is quite simply a liberal"
-- Ken Coates MEP (Lab) of Tony Blair

Chris Malcolm

"Epetruk" <nobody@blackhole.com> writes:

>Simon Brooke wrote:
>> in message <32dgacF3itl49U1@individual.net>, Epetruk
>> ('nobody@blackhole.com') wrote:

>>> I don't see the value of ID cards as a terrorist prevention measure -
>>> quite frankly, I can't understand that argument. To me, they are more
>>> valuable in preventing identity theft (which I believe is going to
>>> be a big issue in the future) and benefit fraud.

>> Surely they _enable_ identity theft? If I steal your ID card, how are
>> you going to prove you're you and I'm not?

>If someone steals my biometric ID card and put their biometrics on the card,
>this may not be enough. For example, the issuer of the card could encrypt
>the biometric information on the card using two different private keys
>that are available only to the issuing organisation, and the card readers
>would use the public key of the issuer to decrypt the information before
>it could be verified against the biometrics of the card holder. The
>challenge
>for the forger is now to get hold of these private keys - not impossible,
>but very difficult.

The trouble with arguments which go "This is virtually impossible to
crack" is that they depend on lots of assumptions. I'm reminded of a
recent annual encryption conference at which the proposers of a new
highly secure method of encryption announced a competition with a cash
prize to anyone who could crack the enciphered message before the next
conference. They were confident that even with the best computers of
the day it would take more than a year's worth of computer time, and
this was their way of demonstrating it.

Someone cracked it during the course of the conference!

It's particlulary easy to sell large bureaucratic organisations like
governments a load of tosh about technical details because the people
at the top are all totally convinced that to take decisions you don't
need to understand the details, you just have to have a large
bureaucratic organisation behind you telling you what to think, or at
least making sure that you can't be blamed for having been misled by
folk who told you what you wanted to hear, the same folk who get
promoted etc. if you like them.

--
Chris Malcolm cam@infirmatics.ed.ac.uk +44 (0)131 651 3445 DoD #205
IPAB, Informatics, JCMB, King's Buildings, Edinburgh, EH9 3JZ, UK
[http://www.dai.ed.ac.uk/homes/cam/]

Andy Leighton

On Thu, 16 Dec 2004 19:38:14 -0000, Doki <mrdoki@gmail.com> wrote:
> I have to wonder what the hell the tories are thinking. They've been
> preaching the virtues of small government, and all of a sudden they're pro
> ID cards.

Well Howard has always been a true believer. I think a number of the Tory
front bench will be given a sick-note so that they don't have to vote
in favour.

--
Andy Leighton => andyl@azaal.plus.com
"The Lord is my shepherd, but we still lost the sheep dog trials"
- Robert Rankin, _They Came And Ate Us_

Chris Malcolm

Call me Bob <usenetCOFFEE@toomanypenguins.co.uk> writes:

>On Thu, 16 Dec 2004 23:04:18 +0000, Michael MacClancy
><herzel@nospamo2.co.uk> wrote:

>>> There's no doubt in my mind that Blunkett should have gone, but I'm not
>>> at all convinced that the reason he went is the reason he should have
>>> gone.

>>But he did. The reason he went is that he abused his public office, didn't
>>he?

>No, the reason he went is that he got /caught/ abusing his public
>office. Most of them get away with it.

It looks to me as though the reason he didn't get away with it is that
he got involved with a woman who wanted children, who had only just
married a man she knew to be infertile, who had a reputation for
collecting powerful men, and had very powerful media connections. I
suspect in this case Blunkett was deceived, and when he discovered
this and tried to use the strong arm of the law to collect what he
considered his rights, he found himself fighting a much less
principled and wily opponent. Once battle had been joined, his having
arrogant self-righteous bully tendencies pretty much ensured that he'd
co-operate fully in his own destruction.

--
Chris Malcolm cam@infirmatics.ed.ac.uk +44 (0)131 651 3445 DoD #205
IPAB, Informatics, JCMB, King's Buildings, Edinburgh, EH9 3JZ, UK
[http://www.dai.ed.ac.uk/homes/cam/]