KILO and F1

Meek One

We all by now know how the UCI and IOC are lying saying neither was responsible for the loss of the kilo. Looks like another international track sport has problems too with it governing body. Read on from an insider about F1:

Much has be written about the politics surrounding the 2005 USGP at INDY…………..for those who missed this account the first time…………..here is what most people accept as the real reason 7 of the 10 teams refused to participate…………..



"What follows is a press release from the MinardiF1 team giving the

views of Paul Stoddart.



"Much has been said about the farce that occurred on Sunday, June 19, in

Indianapolis, and I feel that in the interests of transparency, it would

be worthwhile for someone who was actually present, and participated in

the discussions leading up to the start of the Grand Prix, to provide a

truthful account of what took place, both for the 100,000-plus fans who

were present, and for the hundreds of millions of people watching on

television around the world.



While this is a genuine attempt to provide a factual timeline of the

relevant events that took place, should any minor detail or sequence be

disputed, it will not, in my opinion, affect in any way this account of

events that led up to arguably the most damaging spectacle in the recent

history of Formula One.



Background



For those who have not followed the recent political developments in

Formula One, it is fair to say that, for over a year now, the majority

of teams have felt at odds with the actions of the FIA and its

President, Max Mosley, concerning the regulations, and the way in which

those regulations have been introduced, or are proposed to be

introduced. Not a weekend has gone by where some, or all, of the teams

are not discussing or disputing these regulations. This is so much the

case that it is common knowledge the manufacturers have proposed their

own series commencing January 1, 2008, and this is supported by at least

two of the independent teams. The general perception is that, in many

instances, these issues have become personal, and it is my opinion that

was a serious contributory factor to the failure to find a solution that

would have allowed all 20 cars to compete in Sunday¹s United States

Grand Prix.







The Facts



Friday, June 17

I noticed that Ricardo Zonta¹s Toyota had stopped, but in all honesty,

did not pay any attention to the reasons why; however, I actually

witnessed Ralf Schumacher¹s accident, both on the monitors, and more

significantly, I could see what took place from my position on the pit

wall. This necessitated a red flag, and in the numerous replays on the

monitors, it looked very much like the cause of the accident was a

punctured rear tyre.



Throughout the afternoon, numerous people in the paddock suggested it

was a tyre failure and commented that it was similar to the serious

accident which befell Ralf Schumacher during the 2004 US Grand Prix.

Later that evening was the first time I was aware of a potential problem

with the Michelin tyres at this event. In all honesty, I didn¹t pay a

great deal of attention, as our team is on Bridgestone tyres.



Saturday, June 18

On arriving at the circuit, the word throughout the paddock was that

there was a potential problem with the rear tyres supplied to all

Michelin teams for this event, and it became evident as the first and

second sessions were run that most of the affected teams were being very

conservative with the amount of on-track running they were doing. In

addition, Toyota announced that it had substituted Ricardo Zonta for

Ralf Schumacher, who would take no further part in the event.

Speculation was rife in the paddock that some Michelin teams might not

take part in qualifying. Also, during the practice session, I was

informed there would be a Team Principals¹ meeting with Bernie

Ecclestone at 1430 hrs after qualifying, which I incorrectly assumed

would centre around the Michelin issue.



Qualifying took place, and indeed, all 20 cars qualified for Sunday¹s

Grand Prix.



At approximately 1420 hrs, I attended Bernie¹s office, and with

representatives present from all other teams, including Ferrari, the

meeting commenced. Surprisingly, the main topic of conversation was the

number of events and calendar for 2006, followed by a suggestion that a

meeting be convened at the next Grand Prix to discuss two issues only *

firstly, a proposal for a single-tyre supplier in Formula One, and

secondly, whether or not it would be desirable to qualify with or

without a race fuel load in 2006. Only at the very end of the meeting

did the Michelin tyre issue arise, and in fairness, it was not discussed

in any great detail. I personally found this strange, but as I have

stated, it did not affect Minardi directly, and therefore I had no

reason to pursue the matter.



Throughout Saturday evening, there was considerable speculation in the

paddock that the tyre issue was much more serious than at first thought,

and people were talking about a fresh shipment of tyres being flown

overnight from France, and what penalty the Michelin teams would take

should those tyres be used. By the time I left the paddock, people were

taking bets on Minardi and Jordan scoring points!



Later that evening, I checked with our Sporting Director on what

developments had occurred, and was told that the issue was indeed very

serious, and the possibility existed that the Michelin teams would not

take part in the race.



Sunday, June 19

I arrived at the circuit at 0815 hrs, only to find the paddock was

buzzing with stories suggesting the Michelin teams would be unable to

take part in the Grand Prix. I was then handed a copy of correspondence

between Michelin, the FIA, and the Michelin teams that revealed the true

extent of the problem. By now, journalists were asking if Minardi would

agree to a variation of the regulations to allow the Michelin teams to

compete, and what penalties I felt would be appropriate.



A planned Minardi press briefing took place at 0930 hrs, and as it was

ending, I was summoned to an urgent meeting, along with Jordan, with

Bernie Ecclestone, the two most senior Michelin representatives present

at the circuit, IMS President Tony George, Team Principals, and

technical representatives from the Michelin teams. At this meeting,

Michelin, to its credit, admitted that the tyres available were unable

to complete a race distance around the Indianapolis circuit without a

change to the track configuration, so as to reduce the speed coming out

of the last turn onto the banking. Much background information was

provided as to the enormous efforts that Michelin, with support from its

teams, had undertaken in the preceding 48 hours to try and resolve the

problem, but it was clear that all those efforts had failed to produce a

suitable solution that wouldn¹t involve support from the non-Michelin

teams, and ultimately, the FIA.



What was requested of the Bridgestone teams was to allow a chicane to be

constructed at Turn 13, which would then allow Michelin to advise their

teams that, in their opinion, the tyres would be able to complete the

race distance. It was made very clear that this was the only viable

option available, as previous suggestions from the FIA, such as

speed-limiting the Michelin cars through Turn 13, could, and probably

would, give rise to a monumental accident. This idea, as well as one

concerning the possibility of pit stops every 10 laps, were dismissed,

and discussion returned to the only sensible solution * a chicane.

During this discussion, a technical representative with specific

knowledge of the Indianapolis circuit, together with representatives

from IMS, were tasked with preparing the design of a chicane, and Bernie

Ecclestone agreed to speak with the one Team Principal not present, Mr

Todt, and to inform the FIA President, Max Mosley, who was not present

at Indianapolis, of the planned solution to allow the successful running

of the US Grand Prix. With only a few hours now remaining to the start

of the race, we agreed to reconvene as soon as Bernie had responses from

Messrs Todt and Mosley.



At approximately 1055 hrs, Bernie informed us that not only would Mr

Todt not agree, stating that it was not a Ferrari problem, but an FIA

and a Michelin problem, but also Mr Mosley had stated that if any

attempts were made to alter the circuit, he would cancel the Grand Prix

forthwith. These words had a familiar tone to me, as they were similar

to those I had heard around midnight on the Friday preceding the 2005

Australian Grand Prix, when I was told by all the senior FIA

representatives present that the Australian Grand Prix would be

cancelled forthwith if I did not withdraw pending legal action between

Minardi and the FIA. Once again, Mr Mosley was not present at that Grand

Prix! It is fair to say at this point that the vast majority of people

present in the room both felt and stated that Mr Mosley had completely

overstepped the mark, had no idea whatsoever of the gravity of the

situation, and furthermore, cared even less about the US Grand Prix, its

organisers, the fans, and indeed, the hundreds of millions of television

viewers around the world who were going to be affected by his intransigence.



By this time, the nine teams had discussed running a non- championship

race, or a race in which the Michelin teams could not score points, and

even a race whereby only the Michelin teams used the new chicane, and

indeed, every other possible option that would allow 20 cars to

participate and put on a show, thereby not causing the enormous damage

to Formula One that all those present knew would otherwise occur.



By now, most present felt the only option was to install the chicane and

race, if necessary, without Ferrari, but with 18 cars, in what would

undoubtedly be a non-championship race. We discussed with Bernie the

effects of the FIA withdrawing its staff, and agreed among ourselves a

Race Director, a Safety Car driver, and other essential positions, and

all agreed that, under the circumstances, what was of paramount

importance was that the race must go ahead. All further agreed that

since we would most likely be denied FIA facilities, such as scales and

post-race scrutineering, every competitor would instruct his team and

drivers to conduct themselves in the spirit of providing an entertaining

race for the good of Formula One.



At this point, we called for all 20 drivers, and indeed, all 20 arrived,

at which point we informed them of our plan. While I cannot testify that

each and every driver agreed with what we were proposing, what I can say

with certainty is that no driver disagreed, and indeed, members of the

Grand Prix Drivers¹ Association discussed overseeing the construction of

a suitable chicane. Jean Todt was the only significant team individual

not present, and the Ferrari drivers stated this decision was up to Mr Todt.



I feel it is important to stress that, at this stage, and mindful of the

total impossibility * call it force majeure if you wish * of 14 cars

being able to compete in the race, the nine teams represented agreed

they would not take part in the race unless a solution was found in the

interests of Formula One as a global sport, as it was clear to all

present that the sport, and not the politics, had to prevail if we were

to avoid an impending disaster.



After a short break, we reconvened without the drivers. When I arrived

in Bernie¹s office, Flavio Briatore was on the telephone to Mr Mosley,

and it was quite clear from the body language of the others gathered in

the room that Mr Mosley was having none of our suggestions. At the

conclusion of the telephone call, it was obvious that many of those in

the room had lost all faith in Mr Mosley and his ability to perform his

function as President of the FIA in respect of Formula One matters.



I¹m sure this sentence will be treated with contempt by Mr Mosley, but

what must be realised is that there are various reasons that other Team

Principals, and the most senior people in Formula One, will not say

publicly what they openly feel privately about Mr Mosley, his politics

and his governance of the sport. There is a great temptation to go into

those reasons in detail, but that is for another day. Suffice to say,

those gathered at Indianapolis felt Mr Mosley, and to a lesser degree,

the lack of co-operation from Mr Todt, were about to be responsible for

the greatest FIAsco in Formula One¹s recent history.



Discussions then took place concerning the other telephone calls with Mr

Mosley from, among others, Bernie Ecclestone, Ron Dennis and Tony

George, and it was clearly revealed to what extent Mr Mosley was

prepared to go in order to achieve his aims. To my total disgust, it was

stated that Mosley had informed Mr Martin, the FIA¹s most senior

representative in the USA, that if any kind of non- championship race

was run, or any alteration made to the circuit, the US Grand Prix, and

indeed, all FIA-regulated motorsport in the US, would be under threat *

again, exactly the same tactic that was used in threatening the

Australian Grand Prix and Australian motorsport in March of this year.



By now, it was evident Mosley had bullied the US Grand Prix promoter

into submission, Bernie Ecclestone was powerless to intervene, and all

efforts of the Team Principals, with the exception of Jean Todt, had

failed to save the 2005 US Grand Prix.



At this point, the pit lane had opened and a hasty discussion took place

concerning whether or not the Michelin teams would go to the grid. A

radio had been delivered to me by team personnel at this stage, and I

was able to know which cars were going to the grid. It is interesting to

note that the Jordan Team Principal was not present at this time, and

indeed, it was the Jordans that first proceeded to the grid, followed by

the Ferraris. After discussion with Bernie Ecclestone, it was agreed the

Michelin teams would go to the grid, but were absolutely prevented from

participating in the race because of the tyre situation.







Three teams line up for the US Grand Prix



We then proceeded to the grid, at which point I asked Jordan¹s Colin

Kolles if he intended to stand by the other teams or participate in the

race. In no uncertain terms, I was told Jordan would be racing. I was

also approached by a Bridgestone representative, who informed me that

Bridgestone wished us to race. This left me with one of the most

difficult decisions I have had to take during my time in F1, as I did

not want to race, but given my current relationship with Mr Mosley, felt

certain heavy sanctions would follow if I did not. I made it clear to

Bernie Ecclestone, and several Team Principals, that if the Jordans

either went off or retired, I would withdraw the Minardi cars from the race.



It is important for people to realise that Minardi, the seven Michelin

teams, Bernie Ecclestone, and the promoters did not agree with Mr

Mosley¹s tactics. For the reasons previously outlined, it may take some

considerable time, if ever, for this to be admitted, but there is no

question in my mind that the farce that occurred on Sunday, June 19,

2005 at Indianapolis was the responsibility of the FIA President, Max

Mosley, and compounded by the lack of support from Jean Todt.



For the avoidance of doubt, in my opinion, Michelin was responsible

enough to admit that the problem was of their creation. When one

considers that even the replacement, Barcelona-specification tyres that

were shipped to IMS, when tested, apparently exhibited the same

characteristics as those that originally failed, this clearly is a case

of force majeure, as I do not for a moment believe that Michelin

intentionally brought tyres to the event that were unsuitable for

competition.



Far more importantly, however, Mosley refused to accept any of the

solutions offered, and that refusal was, I believe, politically

motivated. Therefore, I feel he failed in his duty, and that is why I

have called for his resignation.



Much discussion and debate will undoubtedly take place over the coming

weeks and months, but I believe this is a truthful and honest account of

the facts, and not the fiction, surrounding the responsibility for this

FIAsco. People can now make up their own minds!"



Press Release

MinardiF1"

__________________
-Meek
"Some people train to look pretty. I just train so I can be the strongest man there is. And then again, I'm already pretty." -Magnus Samuelsson