J
Jim Menegay
Guest
Guy Hoelzer <[email protected]> wrote in message news:<[email protected]>...
> in article [email protected], Jim Menegay
> at [email protected] wrote on 4/6/04 9:54 PM:
>
> > John's argument, as I understand it, is that an unknown
> > deterministic process could conceivably make the same
> > predictions as the hypothesis of drift.
>
> This is certainly true, although I see no need to invoke
> an "unknown" deterministic process. As I have pointed out
> to John before, natural selection could serve this role.
It appears that I have neglected your priority on the idea
of drift as a null hypothesis. Sorry about that. I probably
read what you wrote, then "forgot" about it.
> Indeed, I have argued several times on sbe that the
> general proposition that selection is responsible for the
> shape of biodiversity is entirely untestable because
> detailed selection models could be constructed to predict
> any biodiversity pattern that could possibly be observed.
> In contrast, the general proposition that drift is
> responsible for the shape of biodiversity is more testable
> because drift is expected to act in the same way all of
> the time. While drift can stumble onto any particular
> pattern in principle, we have a clear expectation of the
> likelihood of such an occurrence, which allows us to
> reject drift as a reasonable sole explanation for observed
> data. There is no such general expectation that has ever
> been proposed for selection, which makes it impossible to
> directly reject a selection-only model for any
> observation. At best we can tenuously (indirectly) reject
> selection as a reasonable explanation for data that fit
> the drift-only model very well.
Exactly! NS explanations have degrees of freedom not present
in the drift null hypothesis. Hence Occam favors drift if
both explain the data.
> > He may well be right about this. Therefore, it seems
> > tactically correct to me to concede his point, but then
> > to point out the philosophical and epistemological
> > silliness of his argument.
>
> Having gone further than concession, and actively making
> this argument myself, has had no effect on John's
> argumentation that I can see.
I never claimed to wisdom ...
> in article [email protected], Jim Menegay
> at [email protected] wrote on 4/6/04 9:54 PM:
>
> > John's argument, as I understand it, is that an unknown
> > deterministic process could conceivably make the same
> > predictions as the hypothesis of drift.
>
> This is certainly true, although I see no need to invoke
> an "unknown" deterministic process. As I have pointed out
> to John before, natural selection could serve this role.
It appears that I have neglected your priority on the idea
of drift as a null hypothesis. Sorry about that. I probably
read what you wrote, then "forgot" about it.
> Indeed, I have argued several times on sbe that the
> general proposition that selection is responsible for the
> shape of biodiversity is entirely untestable because
> detailed selection models could be constructed to predict
> any biodiversity pattern that could possibly be observed.
> In contrast, the general proposition that drift is
> responsible for the shape of biodiversity is more testable
> because drift is expected to act in the same way all of
> the time. While drift can stumble onto any particular
> pattern in principle, we have a clear expectation of the
> likelihood of such an occurrence, which allows us to
> reject drift as a reasonable sole explanation for observed
> data. There is no such general expectation that has ever
> been proposed for selection, which makes it impossible to
> directly reject a selection-only model for any
> observation. At best we can tenuously (indirectly) reject
> selection as a reasonable explanation for data that fit
> the drift-only model very well.
Exactly! NS explanations have degrees of freedom not present
in the drift null hypothesis. Hence Occam favors drift if
both explain the data.
> > He may well be right about this. Therefore, it seems
> > tactically correct to me to concede his point, but then
> > to point out the philosophical and epistemological
> > silliness of his argument.
>
> Having gone further than concession, and actively making
> this argument myself, has had no effect on John's
> argumentation that I can see.
I never claimed to wisdom ...