"Michael Zaharis" <
[email protected]> wrote in message
news:[email protected]...
>
>
> B. Lafferty wrote:
> >>
> >
> >
> > I agree that the oil/border dispute was complex. Whatever the drivers
of
> > that dispute, the US position conveyed by our ambassador, April
Gillespie
> > was indeed a green light for the invasion. But the point of the piece
is
> > really the nature of a multi-decade relationship between the US and
Saddam.
> > We have always had him as ours. I wonder if CBS would run this piece if Soros were to pay for
> > the air time. ;-)
> >
> >
> Please - not the Glaspie (not Gillespie) thing again. The worst she can be accused of is not
> laying out the consequences of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait clearly enough. She stated that the US
> would not take a position on the Iraqi/Kuwaiti border dispute, not thinking that Iraq was
> seriously considering an invasion.
>
> Most of the transcripts were released by Iraq, which I would not consider a reliable source of
> full and complete disclosure (draw your own conclusions). When you take a statement such as the
> "US does not take a position on the border dispute", but leave out the rest of the talk indicating
> that it would be resolved by diplomatic means (through Mubarak or or the Secretary General of the
> Arab League), it appears that the US supported the invasion of Kuwait, but requires ignoring much
> of the conversation that actually took place.
>
>
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/April_Glaspie
The message that Ambassador Glaspie (thanks for the correction) gave was one which she was
specifically told to give. Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising what the result was--no
perceived consequences of the sort eventually delivered by Bush I. What follows is the transcript
and subsequent questions put to her in Baghdad.
--------------------------------------------
http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/ARTICLE5/april.html
Yes, remember April Glaspie and her amazing stint at Middle East diplomacy?
Saddam-Glaspie meeting
Transcript of Meeting Between Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April
Glaspie. - July 25, 1990 (Eight days before the August 2, 1990 Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait)
July 25, 1990 - Presidential Palace - Baghdad
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie - I have direct instructions from President Bush to improve our relations
with Iraq. We have considerable sympathy for your quest for higher oil prices, the immediate cause
of your confrontation with Kuwait. (pause) As you know, I lived here for years and admire your
extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. We know you need funds. We understand that, and our
opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. (pause) We can see that you
have deployed massive numbers of troops in the south. Normally that would be none of our business,
but when this happens in the context of your threat s against Kuwait, then it would be reasonable
for us to be concerned. For this reason, I have received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of
friendship - not confrontation - regarding your intentions: Why are your troops massed so very close
to Kuwait's borders?
Saddam Hussein - As you know, for years now I have made every effort to reach a settlement on our
dispute with Kuwait. There is to be a meeting in two days; I am prepared to give negotiations only
this one more brief chance. (pause) When we (the Iraqis) meet (with the Kuwaitis) and we see there
is hope, then nothing will happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be natural
that Iraq will not accept death.
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie - What solutions would be acceptab le?
Saddam Hussein - If we could keep the whole of the Shatt al Arab - our strategic goal in our war
with Iran - we will make concessions (to the Kuwaitis). But, if we are forced to choose between
keeping half of the Shatt and the whole of Iraq (i.e., in Saddam s view, including Kuwait ) then we
will give up all of the Shatt to defend our claims on Kuwait to keep the whole of Iraq in the shape
we wish it to be. (pause) What is the United States' opinion on this?
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie - We have no opinion on your Arab - Arab conflicts, such as your dispute
with Kuwait. Secretary (of State James) Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first
given to Iraq in the 1960's, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America. (Saddam smiles)
On August 2, 1990, Saddam's massed troops invade and occupy Kuwait. _____
Baghdad, September 2, 1990, U.S. Embassy
One month later, British journalists obtain the the above tape and transcript of the Saddam -
Glaspie meeting of July 29, 1990. Astounded, they confront Ms. Glaspie as she leaves the U.S.
Embassy in Baghdad.
Journalist 1 - Are the transcripts (holding them up) correct, Madam Ambassador?(Ambassador Glaspie
does not respond)
Journalist 2 - You knew Saddam was going to invade (Kuwait ) but you didn't warn him not to. You
didn't tell him America would defend Kuwait. You told him the opposite - that America was not
associated with Kuwait.
Journalist 1 - You encouraged this aggression - his invasi on. What were you thinking?
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie - Obviously, I didn't think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going
to take all of Kuwait.
Journalist 1 - You thought he was just going to take some of it? But, how could you? Saddam told you
that, if negotiations failed , he would give up his Iran (Shatt al Arab waterway) goal for the Whole
of Iraq, in the shape we wish it to be. You know that includes Kuwait, which the Iraqis have always
viewed as an historic part of their country! Journalist 1 - American green-lighted the invasion. At
a minimum, you admit signaling Saddam that some aggression was okay - that the U.S. would not oppose
a grab of the al-Rumeilah oil field, the disputed border strip and the Gulf Islands (including
Bubiyan) - the territories claimed by Iraq?
(Ambassador Glaspie says nothing as a limousine door closed behind her and the car drives off.)
_____
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Information last updated on: 02/09/96