Mark Flinn said:Quoted message said:There is a fine distinction between the 'is vs. ought'
naturalistic fallacy and what we are discussing here. A
current understanding of moral systems, based on
evolutionary theory (e.g., Alexander 1987), does not
suggest that what exists in biological reality ('is'😉
has a higher moral standing ('ought'😉. We are trying to
move beyond the old Spencerian ideas. The anti-
sociobiology groups that tried to discredit evolutionary
approaches with those political tactics were wrong.But that is not to say that 'ought' does not have a
scientific underpinning. Folk beliefs are not random,
and unless we want to place our unquestioning faith in
the Koran or the Bible or the Shaman of your choice,
then we need to try and understand why humans have
'oughts'.
I have a couple of trial balloons to offer on this 'ought'
business. No doubt someone in the group will be able to find
a fly or two in my ointment. Here goes:
'Ought's are entailments or predictions of causal
hypotheses. These come in two basic flavors, with a
subdivision in the second:
1. Run of the mill causal 'ought's, e.g., If it rains
the grass 'ought' to turn green.
2. Rational agent causal 'ought's
a. prudential 'ought's e.g., One 'ought' not drink
to excess.
b. moral 'ought's e.g., One 'ought' to love his
neighbor as he loves himself.
Underlying both the prudential and moral 'oughts' is an
implicit theory of rationality we all share in which
rationality is simply a matter valuative objectivity and,
indeed, valuative objectivity in one form or another
underlies prudential and moral norms the world over
(exceptions to my assumed rule would be most appreciated, if
someone has one or two to offer).
Tying this into evolutionary theory, the chief benefit of
morality is NOT physical, but rather emotional, in that our
self-esteem is heavily dependent on our being able to view
ourselves as rational, i.e., of being relatively more
valuatively objective than non-rational creatures. The
reason we need to nourish our self-esteem is because the
value we attach to ourselves is just another way of talking
about 'the will to survive' in a species that accomplishes
this from long range planning (in contrast to blind
responses to stimuli), and because we ourselves have become
a little too valuatively objective (too rational, according
to our implicit theory of same) for our own good, and now
require EVIDENCE (justification) for the rationally
inordinate sense of importance nature would like us to
maintain in order to insure our survival.
Implicit in this is the contention that nature has not been
selecting for sociality in man, but rather rationality, with
sociality merely one of its many manifestations (i.e. the
need for evidence in the form of the opinions of others that
one has worth in order to sustain one's will to survive).
[snipped]
Quoted message said:Quoted message said:
We will not discover moral 'facts' analogous to the
facts regarding a hydrogen atom. There are no absolute
ultimate morals akin to the physical laws of the
universe.
In an earlier post I actually did offer what I view as a
science like derivation of a moral 'ought' from an epistemic
'is'. I say science-like in the sense that many philosophers
of science I am familiar with have increasingly come to
champion explanationism, a la Pierce, Harmon, Lycan, Thagard
as a more realistic view of the epistemology underlying the
scientific enterprise. Assuming this is so, then my science-
like derivation goes as follows:
1. Assume that 'being rational' is NOT simply a matter of
'being efficient' (means/end theory) 'being logical'
(computationalism) 'being self-interested' (egoism)
'being happy' (pragmatism) 'being strategically logical
(game theory) 'following a universalizable maxim (Kant)
'fulfilling one's desires' (hedonism) 'maximizing global
happiness' (utilitarianism) 'truth or falsehood (Hume)
etc. but simply a matter of 'being able to "see" what is
going on' [non-formalizable] with the metaphor unpacked
to 'being rational' = 'being objective', not only
cognitively, BUT VALUATIVELY AS WELL.
2. Corroborate the epistemic credentials (the "is"
component of the ought derivation) of the above "theory"
in terms of its ability to maximize explanatory
coherence better than any of its competitors (means/end,
egoism, etc.).
For example:
a. The theory can "explain", at least in a conceptual
framework not available from the perspective of
competing theories, both the excessive altruism and
the emotional instability (volatility in self-
worth) observable in [censored] sapiens, in that they can
both be construed as two different sides of the
same valuative objectivity coin (an equalizing of
value between the interests of others and one's
self). Since in the above theory, rationality
correlates with valuative objectivity, [censored] sapiens
would be construed as having become MORE RATIONAL
than the predicted norm (ruthless selfishness).
While this doesn't offer us an immediate causal
account of the anomalies in question (altruism and
emotional instability), it certainly offers one a
new conceptual framework for thinking about them
which, in turn, might lead to an improved causal
account (e.g., they are maladaptive byproducts of
the evolution of rationality).
b. The theory can shed new light on a number of
rationality paradoxes such as Newcomb's Problem,
Prisoner's Dilemma, etc., in that all such
paradoxes stem from the assumption that rationality
is a strategic attribute
c. The theory can circumvent the logical paradoxes
of rational irrationality, similar to the example
offered by Derek Parfit on page 12 of 'Reasons
and Persons'.
d. The theory can explain the chaos of the Cohen
symposium on rationality ('The Behavioral and Brain
Sciences', 1981, 4, 317-370) by sharpening the
distinction between logic and reasoning (I wouldn't
go into this here).
e. The theory can offer intersubjectively reproducible
empirical evidence (feelings of worthlessness) that
mother nature's most rational species is beginning
to show signs of "standing outside the system"
(Lucas) corroborating the Lucas and Penrose
position on the implications of Godel's
incompleteness theorem (i.e., minds are not
machines). (again a bit too complex an issue for
explanation in this particular post).
f. The theory is compatible with what is the currently
accepted paradigm for practical rationality, the
'equal weight' criterion, albeit extended beyond
the periphery of self-interest:
My feelings a year hence should be just as
important to me as my feelings next minute, if
only I could make an equally sure forecast of
them. Indeed this equal and impartial concern
for all parts of one's conscious life is perhaps
the most prominent element in the common notion
of the _rational_. (Henry Sidgwick, 'The Methods
of Ethics'😉.
All these theories [of rational self-interest]
also claim that, in deciding what would be best
for someone, we should give equal weight to all
the parts of this person's future. Later events
may be less predictable; and a predictable event
should count for less if it is less likely to
happen. But it should not count for less merely
because, if it happens, it will happen later
(Derek Parfit, 'Reasons and Persons'😉.
3. Derive the 'ought' component via the syllogism:
PERMISE: 'Given that one chooses to be rational,
CONNECTIVE then MORAL MAXIM: one ought to 'Love
(value) their neighbor as they love (value)
themself'.
Notice that this moral maxim does not contain any values
in the maxim itself. It merely states, given that one
values X such and such an amount, then one ought to
value Y such and such an amount. But that does not mean
that the ought doesn't have underlying premises. Indeed,
it would seem to have both a cognitive AND a valuative
premise. The cognitive premise is that the underlying
theory of rationality is "true", and the valuative
premise is that the individual in question values
rationality. And guess what? I don't think this is
actually MY theory of rationality, in that I suspect the
maxim itself rings a bell in just about anyone capable
of reflective thought.
My conclusion then. Moral oughts are entailments of an
implicit theory of rationality we humans have been
subconsciously entertaining for the past several
thousand years (as evidenced by the widespread
acceptance of the moral maxim) and as such is entailed
by the implicit cognitive premise that our shared theory
of rationality is "true" and the shared valuative
premise that rationality is itself of intrinsic worth,
or at least of sufficient worth to warrant that humans
will often sacrifice their well-being, and at times
their very lives (e.g., self-incinerating Buddhist
monks) in the pursuit of moral objectives.
Phil Roberts, Jr.