Basso - riding foolishly?

"he didn't look like he
was working that hard (unlike in some of the previous stages)."

I actually thought today was the 1st time he looked to be under some
pressure.

"Needs reminded of what, exactly?"

Someone needs to remind Basso that he doesn't need to worry when guys
like Piepoli (personal feelings about him notwithstanding) go up the
road. Piepoli is 18 minutes down on GC and it won't make a bit of
difference to Basso's maglia rosa if Piepoli gains 30 seconds or 10
minutes on him. Basso needs to make sure that he only expends energy
when he absolutely has to, and you can count on two (maybe three)
fingers the number of guys he really needs to worry about.

As for treating this like a warmup...like Toni Rominger has said on
many occasions about the '95 Giro - he'll tell you that he dug so deep
that he was shot for the rest of the season and was never really the
same again after winning that race. Effort spent now may compromise
the Tour this July.

Jim Burlant

Well, you've had 3 or 4 of us who watched the stage telling you that Basso
wasn't in the red, had a chance to show his superiority, pick up time on his
main rival, give Pipo a stage win and win more fans, on a stage that was
almost a rest day and definitely didn't tax him (it was already the shortest
stage, and they cancelled the two main challenges- the Erbe and the last 6km
of Corones). If you still want to claim it was a mistake, be my guest. I'm
not going to try to disabuse you of that idea.

In the case of Armstrong and USP/DSC, physiology IS tactics. The tactics
were based on his physiology, and he trained his body to the tactics. (If
you read Coyle's book, you'll see that the most important number was his LT,
that's what Ferrari mesured and that's what they obsessed over the most.)
That's what the whole blue train was about. Armstrong's lieutenants would
set a tempo that only Armstrong could follow without going into the red.
because he had a higher LT than anyone else. Of course his guys couldn't
themselves keep up the pace, especially the one in front, so the the one
pulling burned out and was replaced. Up until the moment where there were no
more guys. At that point, Armstrong hadn't yet dipped much far into the red,
but his competitors had been there for a while. So when Armstrong attacked,
his opponents were already hurting.

Remember when Beltran first joined the team? Lance complained that he
pulled too hard and had to be told to slow it down. That was because he set
a tempo above Armstrong's LT, which was counterproductive to the tactics.

Also, this explains how Armstrong was able to be stronger on the final climb
than on any previous climb, even after 5 hours in the saddle. The final
climb was when he finally pushed himself to and beyond LT. Also explains why
Armstrong would jump and put time into Ullrich up until a certain point and
then the gap would stabilize. At that point, Armstrong and Ullrich were both
equally in the red and Armstrong had lost his advantage.

BTW- While watching the live RAI feed, you can listen to the Eurosport
audio. If you speak French, I'd suggest the French Eurosport commentators
over the English ones. With all respect to Mr Kelly's palmares, Jacky Durand
and Spotted [censored] do a much better job. Durand is a hoot.

<[email hidden]> a écrit dans le message de news:
[email hidden]...

Quoted message said:

"he didn't look like he
was working that hard (unlike in some of the previous stages)."

I actually thought today was the 1st time he looked to be under some
pressure.

He looked cold and wet to me.

Well, you've had 3 or 4 of us who watched the stage telling you that
Basso
wasn't in the red, had a chance to show his superiority,

[snip]

If you still want to claim it was a mistake, be my guest. I'm
not going to try to disabuse you of that idea.

*****

The piont about Basso's not being under pressure is valid and I stand
corrected there. However...some of this reminds me of the '97 TdF and
Alpe d'Huez. Pantani was 10 or 11 minutes down on GC when he attacked.
Ullrich immediately put the hammer down after Pantani flew the coop.
While ullrich limited his losses to Pantani to 40 seconds or so that
day (if I remember correctly) it was a classic case of what I posted
about when I started this thread. He burned a lot of needless energy
trying to keep a guy in check who was already 10 or 11 minutes down.
He only needed to make sure Virenque didn't go anywhere at that point,
and any of us watching the Tour that year were just blown away by how
strong Ullrich had looked to that point. He looked completely
invincible.

Late in the 3rd week in '97, in a transition stage this came thisclose
to biting Ullrich in the ass. A break containing 4 Festinas and
numbers 2 - 4 on GC got some serious time and Ullrich was down to 1
teammate in the peloton. Ullrich himself was very very fatigued...and
a good part his fatigue that day came down to was that he'd been
spending energy unnecessarily in earlier stages. If I believe [censored]
Voet, the only reason the race came back together was that Virenque was
an idiot and didn't offer the other teams enough money to work with
him.

I'm just sensing that a number of the people who've disagreed with me
would still contend that Ullrich should have been worried about Pantani
that day and that's all I was trying to point out.

Thanks also for the tips on the RAI feed. Too bad it's been 24 years
since I last studied French in high school. :-(

Jim

trg said:

BTW- While watching the live RAI feed, you can listen to the Eurosport
audio. If you speak French, I'd suggest the French Eurosport
commentators over the English ones. With all respect to Mr Kelly's
palmares, Jacky Durand and Spotted [censored] do a much better job. Durand is
a hoot.

Durand is very good. Virenque drives me nuts.

In article <[email hidden]>,

trg said:

In the case of Armstrong and USP/DSC, physiology IS tactics. The tactics
were based on his physiology, and he trained his body to the tactics. (If
you read Coyle's book, you'll see that the most important number was his LT,
that's what Ferrari mesured and that's what they obsessed over the most.)
That's what the whole blue train was about. Armstrong's lieutenants would
set a tempo that only Armstrong could follow without going into the red.
because he had a higher LT than anyone else. Of course his guys couldn't
themselves keep up the pace, especially the one in front, so the the one
pulling burned out and was replaced. Up until the moment where there were no
more guys. At that point, Armstrong hadn't yet dipped much far into the red,
but his competitors had been there for a while. So when Armstrong attacked,
his opponents were already hurting.

I saw this time and again. What I could not work out is
how to keep rivals from drafting the blue train.

--
Michael Press

Jim Burlant said:

Quoted message said:

Even the early LANCE tried to win almost every mountain
stage. After 2003, it became a lot more obvious that he couldn't,
and he rode defensively more often; late Armstrong colors your
perception of his strategy. But at least until then, he always
tried to shred the group that he was in at the base of the climb,
whether or not someone was up the road.

Disagree with you here. Lance's overally strategy was to dominate the
first TT and show everyone who was boss on the 1st mountain stage, but
once he got a good-sized GC gap (5 or more minutes on 2nd place) he
settled down and rode more defensively.

In '99 and '2000 (which is what I'm assuming you're referring to as
"early Lance"😉 he "only" won the first mountain stage each time. And
actually, come to think of it, he didn't win Hautacam in 2000. Look at
the videos if you don't believe me; look at how Alpe d'Huez played out
in '99 to name one example. You'll see that he did what I'm advocating
Basso do for the remaining mountain stages: he let the guys 10 and 15
minutes down attack and gain 30 seconds here and there, but if 2nd and
3rd overall went anywhere he was on them like glue. And towards the
end of the stage (he might have set a high enough tempo to ensure
nobody could get away from him. But he wasn't attacking to try and
gain more time once he was more than 5 minutes up on anyone; at that
point it was up to the guys lower down the classification than him to
try (and fail) to get rid of him.

2001, you ask? Remember, entering the mountains he was approximiately
30 (!!) minutes down on Simon, so the best strategy for winning was to
make sure Lance won the stages because he had to get the jersey. And
it was only after one of the Pyrennean stages that he finally had
enough time on Ullrich to start riding defensively.

2002 - Was not vintage Armstrong IMO; Heras almost rode him off his
wheel going up to La Mongie! But Lance wasn't trying to drop anyone
every chance he got once his lead got over 5 minutes. Ventoux, you
say? Well, Lance wasn't more than 2 or 3 minutes up on Beloki on
overall time when he decided to show him who was boss. And even then,
once his overall lead was 5 or more minutes, he didn't try to
repeatedly drop anyone.

I was thinking of "early" LA as up to L'Alpe d'Huez 2003.
I think you're still not making the distinction between
1) guy who is 10 or 15 minutes down gets in a break
or escapes on the second to last climb and wins the stage
(examples: Otxoa 2000, Felix Cardenas 2001, Botero,
Sastre, Boogerd, ...)
2) guy who is some minutes down attacks Armstrong
at the last climb and gets away, either because Armstrong
wouldn't or couldn't chase.

I'm claiming (2) was rare. I do think it happened
more in 1999, when Armstrong was probably less sure
of his own power and ability to hold form throughout the
Tour. After that, some exceptions I can think of
quickly are Pantani 2000 (Courchevel; I think LA couldn't
hang with him), and then on L'Alpe 2003, when both
Mayo and Vino attacked him on the final ascent. In
retrospect his inability to control them was a sign of
how things would go from then on. But before that,
even if some escaper was up the road, Armstrong
would usually force things on the last climb to chip
away at his GC rivals, and he was usually keeping the
pace high enough to keep others from attacking.

Ultimately, this argument is about perception of
what Basso can do. If he is stretching himself to
his limit now, you may be right; if he knows his limits
and is riding conservatively, you're being a worrywart.
But none of us have knowledge of his condition.
If he blows two days from now and loses 30 minutes,
you can say you told us so - but we'll never know if
slacking off on today's stage would have prevented that.

The point I was trying to make was that LA was only concerned about
making large time gains (usually on the last climb) until his overall
lead got to a certain point.

I can't answer to Pantani at Courchevel in 2000, not having watched the
video (sacrilege! :-)). You may very well be right that LA couldn't
hang with him when he attacked; just the same, he may have also decided
that, since Pantani was still several minutes down, it was okay to
allow him to get 1 or 2 minutes. I don't know so I have to plead
ignorance here.

Alpe d'Huez 2003, Armstrong was definitely not at his best. That was
the first summit finish of that TdF, and for Vino and Mayo to gain the
time they did, it was very clearly a matter where Armstrong just didn't
have the form to put the smack down on the first mountain stage the way
he had in '99 through '02, and the rest of that TdF bore that out.
Even his win at Luz Ardiden could be attributed to an adrenaline surge
induced by his crash, and even Michele Ferrari said so.

Agreed about the argument of our perceptions of Basso's capabilities.

Jim Burlant

Jim Burlant said:

At any rate, why is he even bothering to follow Piepoli in the first
place when he's not even the most remote threat? He simply needs to
sit back with Gutierrez and Simoni, making sure Gutierrez doesn't go
anywhere and if Simoni goes more than 1 minute up the road, then up his
own tempo to make sure he doesn't get more than that one minute. It's
just about limiting the amount of time Basso spends riding at his
threshold.

Perhaps he prefers the cannibal methodology to the modern one. Or maybe
he's a vampire.

Quoted message said:

2) guy who is some minutes down attacks Armstrong
at the last climb and gets away, either because Armstrong
wouldn't or couldn't chase.

I'm claiming (2) was rare. I do think it happened
more in 1999, when Armstrong was probably less sure
of his own power and ability to hold form throughout the
Tour. After that, some exceptions I can think of
quickly are Pantani 2000 (Courchevel; I think LA couldn't
hang with him), and then on L'Alpe 2003, ...

Add Laiseka in 2001. Armstrong attacks in all mountain stages in 2002
were more the exception than the rule. He also faced the weakest
opposition that year.

Jenko

Jim Burlant said:

Agreed w/you on all points. This is as much of a philosophical debate
as anything else. I remember Indurain taking lots of flack in this NG
because of his defensive - albeit completely effective - tactics.
Granted, it doesn't have the panache of aggressive riding but to each
his own, you know? :-)

You're saying Indurain never tested positive for panache.

in message <[email hidden]>, trg

(') said:

Well, you've had 3 or 4 of us who watched the stage telling you that
Basso wasn't in the red, had a chance to show his superiority, pick up
time on his main rival, give Pipo a stage win and win more fans, on a
stage that was almost a rest day and definitely didn't tax him (it was
already the shortest stage, and they cancelled the two main challenges-
the Erbe and the last 6km of Corones). If you still want to claim it
was a mistake, be my guest. I'm not going to try to disabuse you of
that idea.

It was not a 'rest day'. It was horrible, bitterly cold. The whole
peloton was clearly suffering. I'm not saying Basso was suffering more
than the rest, I don't think he was. But yesterday in the Dolomites was
not an easy ride.

On the other hand, I agree with you that Basso appeared to be able to do
some damage to Gutierrez without obviously struggling himself.

Interesting that Riis said publicly that they should have gone on the
final 5Km. It's probably just a psychological play, seeking to
intimidate the opposition, but it implies he thinks Basso would have
been up to it.

--
[email hidden] (Simon Brooke) http://www.jasmine.org.uk/~simon/
Wannabe a Web designer?
<URL:http://userfriendly.org/cartoons/archives/97dec/19971206.html>

With the exception of '95 (Liege) and perhaps Hautacam ('94) by and
large Indurain's tactic was always to dominate the TTs and defend in
the mountains. Fans complained but the tactics were very very
intellligent.

Jim Burlant

"Robert Chung" <[email hidden]> a écrit dans le message de news:
[email hidden]...

Quoted message said:

trg said:

BTW- While watching the live RAI feed, you can listen to the Eurosport
audio. If you speak French, I'd suggest the French Eurosport
commentators over the English ones. With all respect to Mr Kelly's
palmares, Jacky Durand and Spotted [censored] do a much better job. Durand is
a hoot.

Durand is very good. Virenque drives me nuts.

Agreed, but he isn't there most of the time and doesn't talk all that much.
And still he's miles better than Jean Rene Goddard.

Quoted message said:

Seems to me that someone needs to remind Ivan Basso that, this far into
the Giro, Basso's tactics need to change slightly. What am I talking
about?

I dunno. I wish I could ride as foolishly as Basso. I also wish I could
date his sister, but that's another topic altogether.

routebeer said:

I dunno. I wish I could ride as foolishly as Basso. I also wish I could
date his sister, but that's another topic altogether.

You'd probably have more of a chance of doing the latter if you could
do the former. Such is life.

Curtis L. Russell
Odenton, MD (USA)
Just someone on two wheels...

"Michael Press" <[email hidden]> a écrit dans le message de news:
[email hidden]...

Quoted message said:

In article <[email hidden]>,

trg said:

In the case of Armstrong and USP/DSC, physiology IS tactics. The tactics
were based on his physiology, and he trained his body to the tactics. (If
you read Coyle's book, you'll see that the most important number was his
LT,
that's what Ferrari mesured and that's what they obsessed over the most.)
That's what the whole blue train was about. Armstrong's lieutenants would
set a tempo that only Armstrong could follow without going into the red.
because he had a higher LT than anyone else. Of course his guys couldn't
themselves keep up the pace, especially the one in front, so the the one
pulling burned out and was replaced. Up until the moment where there were
no
more guys. At that point, Armstrong hadn't yet dipped much far into the
red,
but his competitors had been there for a while. So when Armstrong
attacked,
his opponents were already hurting.

I saw this time and again. What I could not work out is
how to keep rivals from drafting the blue train.

--
Michael Press

It doesn't matter that they're drafting, so is Armstrong. As long as the
power required to ride, even when drafting, is above the LT of everyone but
Armstrong.

Suppose that pulling the bunch is requiring 500 watts, and that being pulled
"only" requires 430. Say Lance's LT is 440 and Ullrich's is 420. Both of
them are using 430, so both are being helped from drafting, but the pace has
been set such that only Armstrong is below LT. When the lead guy blows, the
next takes over keeping up the same level of effort.

routebeer said:

Quoted message said:

Seems to me that someone needs to remind Ivan Basso that, this far into
the Giro, Basso's tactics need to change slightly. What am I talking
about?

I dunno. I wish I could ride as foolishly as Basso. I also wish I could
date his sister, but that's another topic altogether.

You might be able to finger her if you worked for the Spanish police.