A number I'd like to know...



qtq wrote:
>
> gwhite <[email protected]> wrote in
> news:[email protected]:
>
> > The empirical evidence shows
> > that world energy consumption will grow, and always has as
> > productivity grows. The macroeconomic argument helps shed light on
> > why this is so, and helps us get real. Why not just think about it
> > for awhile?

>
> The obvious explanation for why world energy consumption grows as
> productivity grows is that the extra energy is fueling the productivity.



Yes, exactly. And it will continue. The only way government intervention can
really "do something" is to take a bite out of productivity (or contract the
money supply), which more or less will mean recession/depression. This is not
politically possible. As a note, it is also outside my "all other things equal"
simplification.
 
gwhite wrote:

>Peter Cole wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>>>Local conservation != global conservation
>>>
>>>That's all.
>>>
>>>

>>But, global conservation == local conservation,...
>>
>>

>
>No. Unfortunately the evidence counters you -- consumption is growing.
>
>
>
>
>> ... & we have to start somewhere.
>>
>>

>
>I pointed out that the place to start out with concerns about energy is to get
>real about what we can or cannot accomplish. Also, the idea that "we must
>conserve energy" is another point that is not necessarily a "given" in the
>strength that some *believe* it should be. As I've pointed out, there are
>enormous amounts of energy available -- doomsday projections aren't enough
>without the substance to back them up. The argument put forth by so-called
>conservationists about needing to conserve energy (in a way beyond what one
>would tend to "conserve" simply paying market costs) mostly stems from a refusal
>to acknowledge nuclear power and focus on fossil fuels as the only substantial
>source in the forseeable future. My *guess* is that nuclear will be used in the
>future much more that it is today (sooner or later). Time will tell. Plants
>are being built today. That is a fact.
>
>
>
>
>
>>>Just because a politician (or bureaucrat with
>>>vested interest) states that a policy has
>>>"such and such intent/goal," does not mean the goal is
>>>achieved.
>>>
>>>

>>Uhm, now you're putting words in my mouth. I think your point is either too
>>convoluted for me to follow or vanishingly subtle. In any case, I didn't
>>say anything like that.
>>
>>

>
>I'm not claiming you "said it." However, where you would "start" is where
>"they" would start (and "they" say so, as do you). That is, with what I
>consider to be a false premise regarding what can and cannot be accomplished.
>You can't just will something to be true and hope that good intentions are
>enough -- they aren't. Recall it is you that entered the thread by supplying a
>post filled with notes about government intervention (government policy).
>
>The phrase "Law of Unintended Consequences" was created by economists to
>describe political policies that do not produce the intended results, despite
>glorious and wonderful goals on which everyone agrees, and which invoked the
>policy. The empirical evidence shows that world energy consumption will grow,
>and always has as productivity grows. The macroeconomic argument helps shed
>light on why this is so, and helps us get real. Why not just think about it for
>awhile?
>


As these sources are either unknown or merely unrealized projections of
established theory, I would think the onus on the proof would be on
those that insist these supplies are available, when we are not
currently tapping them.

Remember also, that it's not only the quantity of untapped reserves that
is important but more importantly, the rate they can become available
that is important. The case has not been made that these sources will be
ramped up to cover the imminent shortfall in oil production. And if you
think that such a shortfall can't be proven, the opposite case requires
that we have an infinite supply of oil in the earth. Clearly a false
assumption. And since only two nations have not seen their local peaks
in oil production but all the other nations have, then our pool
potential swing producers is down to two. And the consensus is rapidly
coming to the conclusion that Saudi Arabia is peaking and we're left
with the smaller fields in Iraq being the last swing producer.

Nukes for instance need to demonstrate a lot of scaleability right now.
If we can't build them en-masse in the best of times, I have trouble
believe we can build them en-masse in the worst of times.

Consider that nukes produce only about 6.3% of the world's total energy
(not electricity), and that's with about 440 operating nukes. This means
that to rely on nukes for only our current power needs, we'd need 6984
of them. This ignore the fact that a growing population and capitalism
requires growth. Once oil goes into it's expect 3% per year decline, we
need to have have a program already in place building approximately 350
of them a year, worldwide. I'd like to see you meet the burden of proof
demonstrating that this is likely.

Jack Dingler
 
cycommuter wrote:
>
> gwhite <[email protected]> wrote in message news:<[email protected]>...
> > "B.B." wrote:
> > >

> >
> > > You're omitting one really big element: indirect energy savings.

> >
> > I am not "omitting" anything. Sheesh!!! Why can't you guys address the
> > *argument*, instead repeatedly ignoring it.

>
> Is the rebound effect necessarily 100%? If, for instance, I purchase
> a more efficient refrigerator, I won't always buy two, just because
> I'm saving so much money. In other words, no. It's not 100% always.
>
> According to: http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/energy/eng-80.cfm?&CFID=11262148&CFTOKEN=7028302


I've already read that article long ago. The rebound effect is an incomplete
picture, as noted in the article I posted long ago.

> Interesting, but most of the cost of the
> Starbucks coffee isn't energy, indeed, it's a small fraction of the
> cost.


No. It is 100% of the cost. Mass is neither created or destroyed, it is only
reformed and moved, which is *all* energy. That is why energy is unlike any
other good on the marketplace.

> It's also amusing that a nuclear power advocate would repeatedly use
> the phrase "mass is neither created nor destroyed", but I digress.


Yes, you digress. It is not important in any way we care about here.

> > All other things equal, any secondary benefits do not amount to global
> > conservation, even if local conservation is acheived. By all means, conserve
> > locally: it is a good thing. Don't delude yourself into thinking you are
> > conserving globally. You aren't.

>
> If we all live by your theories, you're right, we're not saving energy
> in the net. On the other hand, the world is much more complicated
> than the musings of an 19th century logician.


LOL. I was only saying that this concept isn't "news."

> Certainly, if you make
> enough simplifying assumptions, you can wrap your mind around it.


The simplification I've used, is simply for *beginning* to think about the
problem in a macroeconomic way. It is in part for didactic purposes. Obviously
it gets more complicated when one realizes not every energy does not have some
homogeneous (across time, place, and source) cost. To the extent people begin
to think about the problem more expansively, I've had a measure of success.

> Jevons was wrong about the coal, after all.


You are confused about what he was right about and what he was wrong about. He
was *wrong* in saying that England would run out of coal (or just energy). I
already said he was wrong about this -- England obvoiusly did not run out of
coal and those who would side with Jevons' fear might want to take note of
that. For the key part of this thread, he was *right* in his observation that
increased efficiency simply led to more energy usage. Of course, this
*observation* (it was empirical, not theoretical), is what drove his fear of
running out of coal!

> Okay. So, Jevons was wrong about the coal, you've apparently
> dramatically overstated the power of the rebound effect that Jevons
> proposed...


No, rebound is only part of the problem. But even then, it is good someone even
acknowledges that. Because to do so recognizes that simplistic arithmetic
computations presented here could only be wrong. This is a good start.

> ... and I don't think anyone has switched sides on the need for
> breeder reactors.


Please do not distort what I wrote. I am not "promoting" that form of energy or
trying to convince others of its "correctness." I simply believe that humans
will increase their use of nuclear energy and it will happen sooner or later. I
am pointing out that it represents huge reserves of energy, so claims that the
world will be out of energy when the fossil fuels become prohibitively expensive
is factually incorrect. I do not see how this fact can be seriously argued.
 
Jack Dingler wrote:
>


> As these sources are either unknown or merely unrealized projections of
> established theory, I would think the onus on the proof would be on
> those that insist these supplies are available, when we are not
> currently tapping them.


You were already provided a link regarding actual breeder reactors. You were
already provided a link regarding existing and under construction conventional
nukes.

> Remember also, that it's not only the quantity of untapped reserves that
> is important but more importantly, the rate they can become available
> that is important. The case has not been made that these sources will be
> ramped up to cover the imminent shortfall in oil production.


They won't when and where coal and other sources of energy are cheaper. They'll
get ramped up quicker if the costs of other forms become more expensive. This
is a simple subsitution effect. I don't get your problem.

> And if you
> think that such a shortfall can't be proven, the opposite case requires
> that we have an infinite supply of oil in the earth. Clearly a false
> assumption. And since only two nations have not seen their local peaks
> in oil production but all the other nations have, then our pool
> potential swing producers is down to two. And the consensus is rapidly
> coming to the conclusion that Saudi Arabia is peaking and we're left
> with the smaller fields in Iraq being the last swing producer.



And all this is relevent to.... what?

> Nukes for instance need to demonstrate a lot of scaleability right now.


Umm, they already have. Look at France. I think we have over 200 nukes here
right now (20% of energy), and that is with no new plants built in over 20
years.

> If we can't build them en-masse in the best of times, I have trouble
> believe we can build them en-masse in the worst of times.


Oh, that's exactly when they'll get built. Remember, a nuke has high capital
costs; coal and coal plants are still *relatively* cheap, politically and
actually.

> Consider that nukes produce only about 6.3% of the world's total energy
> (not electricity), and that's with about 440 operating nukes. This means
> that to rely on nukes for only our current power needs, we'd need 6984
> of them. This ignore the fact that a growing population and capitalism
> requires growth. Once oil goes into it's expect 3% per year decline, we
> need to have have a program already in place building approximately 350
> of them a year, worldwide. I'd like to see you meet the burden of proof
> demonstrating that this is likely.


If they are a bit more expensive than coal, for example, then for sure it will
be a drag on growth. Humans know how to build nukes. When the balance of costs
tilts more towards their favor, I see no reason why they will not get built, as
deemed "necessary." The coal/oil spigot is not going to get turned off all of
the sudden. It will happen over time, and there is no reason to believe that as
the cost of these sources creeps upwards (when?), then wind, solar, nuclear, and
other forms will be ramped up. In this sense, it is just like anything else.
 
gwhite wrote:

>Jack Dingler wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>>As these sources are either unknown or merely unrealized projections of
>>established theory, I would think the onus on the proof would be on
>>those that insist these supplies are available, when we are not
>>currently tapping them.
>>
>>

>
>You were already provided a link regarding actual breeder reactors. You were
>already provided a link regarding existing and under construction conventional
>nukes.
>
>

You didn't make your case that a rapid ramping up to the numbers needed
is practical or possible. You agreed that the political climate is
difficult. I find such admissions to be supportive of my arguments, not
yours.

>>Remember also, that it's not only the quantity of untapped reserves that
>>is important but more importantly, the rate they can become available
>>that is important. The case has not been made that these sources will be
>>ramped up to cover the imminent shortfall in oil production.
>>
>>

>
>They won't when and where coal and other sources of energy are cheaper. They'll
>get ramped up quicker if the costs of other forms become more expensive. This
>is a simple subsitution effect. I don't get your problem.
>
>


Once oil, coal and natural gas become more expensive, where will the
energy come from to make the materials to build the nukes? If the
materials needed to make the nukes become more expensive (and they are
now), won't construction of the nukes become more expensive? And doesn't
this effect the bottom line, meaning that as the price of energy goes
up, so does the difficulty in investing in nukes?

Consider also that most of the stages of uranium mining and processing
is highly dependent on oil and natural gas. Though in theory, these
steps could be performed with the electricity from nukes, such an
infrastructure doesn't exist now. In fact, it will require a substantial
investment to build new facilities and convert existing ones.

>>And if you
>>think that such a shortfall can't be proven, the opposite case requires
>>that we have an infinite supply of oil in the earth. Clearly a false
>>assumption. And since only two nations have not seen their local peaks
>>in oil production but all the other nations have, then our pool
>>potential swing producers is down to two. And the consensus is rapidly
>>coming to the conclusion that Saudi Arabia is peaking and we're left
>>with the smaller fields in Iraq being the last swing producer.
>>
>>

>
>
>And all this is relevent to.... what?
>
>

I thought I was clear. It means we need these investments start soon so
they can go into production soon.

>
>
>>Nukes for instance need to demonstrate a lot of scaleability right now.
>>
>>

>
>Umm, they already have. Look at France. I think we have over 200 nukes here
>right now (20% of energy), and that is with no new plants built in over 20
>years.
>
>

20% of the electricity, but only 6.3% of the total energy. You've argued
that nukes will replace oil. This means that nukes will power the
current uses that oil current powers including long haul trucking and
freighters.

You're only looking at a slim sliver of the overall picture. Oil is
hardly even a component in the total electricity picture. Your argument
is that nukes can take over most electricity production and expand to
replace oil and coal. That's a tall order and you've just made it clear
that you don't understand the full scope of this issue.

>>If we can't build them en-masse in the best of times, I have trouble
>>believe we can build them en-masse in the worst of times.
>>
>>

>
>Oh, that's exactly when they'll get built. Remember, a nuke has high capital
>costs; coal and coal plants are still *relatively* cheap, politically and
>actually.
>
>
>
>>Consider that nukes produce only about 6.3% of the world's total energy
>>(not electricity), and that's with about 440 operating nukes. This means
>>that to rely on nukes for only our current power needs, we'd need 6984
>>of them. This ignore the fact that a growing population and capitalism
>>requires growth. Once oil goes into it's expect 3% per year decline, we
>>need to have have a program already in place building approximately 350
>>of them a year, worldwide. I'd like to see you meet the burden of proof
>>demonstrating that this is likely.
>>
>>

>
>If they are a bit more expensive than coal, for example, then for sure it will
>be a drag on growth. Humans know how to build nukes. When the balance of costs
>tilts more towards their favor, I see no reason why they will not get built, as
>deemed "necessary." The coal/oil spigot is not going to get turned off all of
>the sudden. It will happen over time, and there is no reason to believe that as
>the cost of these sources creeps upwards (when?), then wind, solar, nuclear, and
>other forms will be ramped up. In this sense, it is just like anything else.
>


As I argued, oil, coal and natural gas are consumed to make virtually
everything needed to construct a nuclear power station. As the prices of
these energy sources rise, the cost of building nukes will rise with
them. You seem to be arguing that construction costs will be frozen for
nukes while the cost for everything else will rise. That is clearly a
bad assumption.

Doesn't it make sense to begin investing in building these thousands of
needed nukes throughout the world now, while energy and materials prices
are lower, rather than wait until we have a declining store of energy to
build them with? Won't it be worse to wait, as the energy and materials
diverted to build nukes will have to come as a sacrifice from other
industries and life sustaining endeavors?

Doesn't it make sense to make investments when you can afford to, rather
than waiting until you need to benefit? You wouldn't wait to invest in a
retirement plan, after you retire would you? Yet you argue that we
should wait until we're past needing the benefits of the nukes, before
building them. Sort of like waiting until it rains to fix a leaky roof.

Jack Dingler
 
gwhite <[email protected]> wrote in message news:<[email protected]>...
> Brent Hugh wrote:
> > That is to say, instead of asking how much oil is SAVED by the present
> > amount of bicycling in the U.S., I asked the converse:.....
> >
> > How much oil is WASTED by the present policies that artificially make
> > driving seem inexpensive to the end user and thus encourage driving
> > and discourage bicycling, walking, transit use, and other
> > alternatives?

<<<Snippety-snip . . . >>>
> you." Moreover, your "oil is wasted" statement is a value judgement, not an
> economic argument.


Some of us take as our major premise the idea that our culture has
some serious problems and should be changed in some very fundamental
ways (yes, this IS a value judgment, thank you). When you change the
culture, you actually change the underlying economic realities--how
people spend their time, money, and energy (both literal and
figurative). When you do this you change the economy in ways that
cannot be predicted via the usual economic theories and tools (though
I'm not quite sure that your arguments fall under the category of "the
usual economic theories and tools").

Now I am going to list 6 numbers that blow your entire theory right
out of the water:

2002 Per Capita Total Primary Energy Consumption, in million BTU:
United States: 391
Germany: 173
Denmark: 156
France: 184
Japan: 172
Australia: 286

These countries are all industrialized first-world nations, they have
the same types of economies, similar per-capita GNP, similar economic
productivity rates, similar standard of living (in fact some of these
countries rate higher in standard of living than the U.S.), similar
temperate climates, and so on. Of course, you can tease out a few
economic differences, but none of them explains the huge difference in
energy usage in the way you want to.

I'm not cherry-picking my countries to make my point, either. There
are only two or three large industrialized countries that use more
energy per capita than the U.S. (Canada, Iceland, Singapore, . . . ).
And the average annual per capita energy usage in 27 of the larger
industrialized countries is 227 million BTU.

That's about 60% of the U.S. per capita energy usage.

(So they're maintaining equal quality of life and equivalent economies
while using 60% the energy. So much for your argument.)

How do they manage to get by on only 60% of the energy the U.S. uses?
Well, it doesn't take a genius to figure out that their tax
structures, their economies, their land-use planning, and their
cultures are set up to encourage, far more than the U.S. does, all the
things that we ordinarily associate with "energy conservation":
smaller dwellings, more compact land use, closer proximity of
dwellings and destinations (ie, less "suburbia"), less use of the
personal automobile and far greater percentages of walking, bicycling,
and mass transit use, smaller and more efficient automobiles, less use
of air conditioning and heating, and on and on and on.

Not coincidentally, the average life span in many of these countries
is longer than in the U.S.

Returning to the original question--how much energy does bicycling
save in the U.S.?

This line of argument doesn't give a simple or definitive answer but
it shows VERY clearly that countries that are otherwise similar to the
U.S. but which have policies in place that encourage "conservation",
including such measures as more walking, bicycling, and mass transit
use, save a whole lot of energy as compared to the U.S. while
maintaining similarly strong economies and high standards of living.

--Brent
bhugh [at] mwsc.edu
www.MoBikeFed.org

Notes:

You can find total energy use and per capita use for the entire world,
and for specific regions, and countries at

http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/total.html

The specific per capita energy use figures I noted above came from
this Excel file:

http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/tablee1c.xls

World life expectancy figures:

http://geography.about.com/library/weekly/aa042000b.htm
 
Jack Dingler wrote:
>
> gwhite wrote:
>
> >Jack Dingler wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >>As these sources are either unknown or merely unrealized projections of
> >>established theory, I would think the onus on the proof would be on
> >>those that insist these supplies are available, when we are not
> >>currently tapping them.
> >>
> >>

> >
> >You were already provided a link regarding actual breeder reactors. You were
> >already provided a link regarding existing and under construction conventional
> >nukes.
> >
> >

> You didn't make your case that a rapid ramping up to the numbers needed
> is practical or possible. You agreed that the political climate is
> difficult. I find such admissions to be supportive of my arguments, not
> yours.


I think you have a static view of the world. Political views and technology
change over time. They particularly change when the costs become more apparent
which is perhaps another way of saying "more painful." I mean cost in a very
broad sense, although it probably will come right down to dollars in some way.

I don't really need to cover any "rapid ramping" argument. *You* are the one
claiming this, with no specifics whatsoever.

> >>Remember also, that it's not only the quantity of untapped reserves that
> >>is important but more importantly, the rate they can become available
> >>that is important. The case has not been made that these sources will be
> >>ramped up to cover the imminent shortfall in oil production.
> >>
> >>

> >
> >They won't when and where coal and other sources of energy are cheaper. They'll
> >get ramped up quicker if the costs of other forms become more expensive. This
> >is a simple subsitution effect. I don't get your problem.
> >
> >

>
> Once oil, coal and natural gas become more expensive, where will the
> energy come from to make the materials to build the nukes? If the
> materials needed to make the nukes become more expensive (and they are
> now), won't construction of the nukes become more expensive? And doesn't
> this effect the bottom line, meaning that as the price of energy goes
> up, so does the difficulty in investing in nukes?
>
> Consider also that most of the stages of uranium mining and processing
> is highly dependent on oil and natural gas. Though in theory, these
> steps could be performed with the electricity from nukes, such an
> infrastructure doesn't exist now. In fact, it will require a substantial
> investment to build new facilities and convert existing ones.


You are really going off on a tangent. To the extent costs of energy go up,
economic activity and growth will slow, stall, etc. I suspect that most people
won't favor that. Sure, it might be "cheaper" in some sense to build nukes
today rather than tommorrow. It might be smart, maybe not. I don't know and am
not even attempting to make that sort of judgement. I said I believe increasing
use will be made of nuclear energy. Nothing you said changes that. You are
only making vague statements about difficilties. So what? Sure it's
"difficult." If you compared today's highway system or power grid to that which
existed 100 years ago, you'd (100 years ago) say "gee, building all that 'stuff'
is going to be hard." No ****. Life is hard, it always has been.

> >And all this is relevent to.... what?
> >
> >

> I thought I was clear. It means we need these investments start soon so
> they can go into production soon.


There has already *been* investment. There *is* investment. I not clear on why
you want to ignore it, and you aren't calling it out. If you have an agenda,
just say so.

> >>Nukes for instance need to demonstrate a lot of scaleability right now.
> >>
> >>

> >
> >Umm, they already have. Look at France. I think we have over 200 nukes here
> >right now (20% of energy), and that is with no new plants built in over 20
> >years.
> >
> >

> 20% of the electricity, but only 6.3% of the total energy. You've argued
> that nukes will replace oil. This means that nukes will power the
> current uses that oil current powers including long haul trucking and
> freighters.


Yeah, so what? What makes you think that transportation tommorrow will "look
like" transportation today? Where does this static world view come from?
Gas/diesel trucks obsoleted horse and cart. Hay are horses are gone. Diesel
trucks will probably dissappear someday. Sure, the machine and the energy will
match. What's the big deal?

We don't use gas/oil lamps anymore either. They were "good" for awhile though.

> You're only looking at a slim sliver of the overall picture. Oil is
> hardly even a component in the total electricity picture.


Well that only makes oil *less* important, not more.

> Your argument is that nukes can take over most
> electricity production and expand to
> replace oil and coal.


Well they certainly could, at least technically in the raw output sense. Nukes
need to compete on price though. I don't see much purpose in overinvestment any
more than I would pay $1500 for a bike where I could get a $1200 bike that met
my needs just as well. If there is "forward looking" that makes the $1500
dollar bike look better, maybe I'll consider. As ever, "it depends," just like
any assessment.

> That's a tall order and you've just made it clear
> that you don't understand the full scope of this issue.
>
> >>If we can't build them en-masse in the best of times, I have trouble
> >>believe we can build them en-masse in the worst of times.
> >>
> >>

> >
> >Oh, that's exactly when they'll get built. Remember, a nuke has high capital
> >costs; coal and coal plants are still *relatively* cheap, politically and
> >actually.
> >
> >
> >
> >>Consider that nukes produce only about 6.3% of the world's total energy
> >>(not electricity), and that's with about 440 operating nukes. This means
> >>that to rely on nukes for only our current power needs, we'd need 6984
> >>of them. This ignore the fact that a growing population and capitalism
> >>requires growth. Once oil goes into it's expect 3% per year decline, we
> >>need to have have a program already in place building approximately 350
> >>of them a year, worldwide. I'd like to see you meet the burden of proof
> >>demonstrating that this is likely.
> >>
> >>

> >
> >If they are a bit more expensive than coal, for example, then for sure it will
> >be a drag on growth. Humans know how to build nukes. When the balance of costs
> >tilts more towards their favor, I see no reason why they will not get built, as
> >deemed "necessary." The coal/oil spigot is not going to get turned off all of
> >the sudden. It will happen over time, and there is no reason to believe that as
> >the cost of these sources creeps upwards (when?), then wind, solar, nuclear, and
> >other forms will be ramped up. In this sense, it is just like anything else.
> >

>
> As I argued, oil, coal and natural gas are consumed to make virtually
> everything needed to construct a nuclear power station. As the prices of
> these energy sources rise, the cost of building nukes will rise with
> them. You seem to be arguing that construction costs will be frozen for
> nukes while the cost for everything else will rise. That is clearly a
> bad assumption.


I made *no* such statement. I don't know if you are suggesting that "they could
not be afforded," but I don't know how you could make such a supposition.

> Doesn't it make sense to begin investing in building these thousands of
> needed nukes throughout the world now, while energy and materials prices
> are lower, rather than wait until we have a declining store of energy to
> build them with? Won't it be worse to wait, as the energy and materials
> diverted to build nukes will have to come as a sacrifice from other
> industries and life sustaining endeavors?
>
> Doesn't it make sense to make investments when you can afford to, rather
> than waiting until you need to benefit? You wouldn't wait to invest in a
> retirement plan, after you retire would you? Yet you argue that we
> should wait until we're past needing the benefits of the nukes, before
> building them. Sort of like waiting until it rains to fix a leaky roof.


You are apparently arguing something I have not claimed one way or another.
Maybe more should be built now. It isn't up to me, and I don't really know.
This is because I make no claim to intimately know the precise costs, or more
importantly how they balance by location, by time, and by specific design (which
invariably will improve thus lowering cost). Some nukes (and a tiny number of
breeders) have been built so *someone* seemed to think it was worth doing. Some
are under construction now, so *some* seem to think the balance of costs is
indeed tilted in favor of nukes. I do know that nukes are capable of producing
enormous amounts of energy. This is indisputable. What that means is claims of
energy doom due to fossil fuel depletion are factually incorrect.
 
Brent Hugh wrote:
>
> gwhite <[email protected]> wrote in message news:<[email protected]>...
> > Brent Hugh wrote:
> > > That is to say, instead of asking how much oil is SAVED by the present
> > > amount of bicycling in the U.S., I asked the converse:.....
> > >
> > > How much oil is WASTED by the present policies that artificially make
> > > driving seem inexpensive to the end user and thus encourage driving
> > > and discourage bicycling, walking, transit use, and other
> > > alternatives?

> <<<Snippety-snip . . . >>>
> > you." Moreover, your "oil is wasted" statement is a value judgement, not an
> > economic argument.

>
> Some of us take as our major premise the idea that our culture has
> some serious problems and should be changed in some very fundamental
> ways (yes, this IS a value judgment, thank you). When you change the
> culture,...


Talk about pipe dreams.

>... you actually change the underlying economic realities--how
> people spend their time, money, and energy (both literal and
> figurative). When you do this you change the economy in ways that
> cannot be predicted via the usual economic theories and tools (though
> I'm not quite sure that your arguments fall under the category of "the
> usual economic theories and tools").
>
> Now I am going to list 6 numbers that blow your entire theory right
> out of the water:
>
> 2002 Per Capita Total Primary Energy Consumption, in million BTU:
> United States: 391
> Germany: 173
> Denmark: 156
> France: 184
> Japan: 172
> Australia: 286
>
> These countries are all industrialized first-world nations, they have
> the same types of economies, similar per-capita GNP, similar economic
> productivity rates, similar standard of living (in fact some of these
> countries rate higher in standard of living than the U.S.), similar
> temperate climates, and so on. Of course, you can tease out a few
> economic differences, but none of them explains the huge difference in
> energy usage in the way you want to.


No, what your problem is is that this is *all value judgement*. The precept is
that there is some "equivalence" between all these countries and purportedly
something "wrong" with the US. Sorry, but that is entirely a value judgement
since that is what "standards of living" is all about. To force a nation to
adopt some other nations culture, though some arbitrary set of value judgements
is a tyrannical point of view. The Board of the Rightly Thinking Elite always
judge themselves correct though, of course!

> I'm not cherry-picking my countries to make my point, either. There
> are only two or three large industrialized countries that use more
> energy per capita than the U.S. (Canada, Iceland, Singapore, . . . ).
> And the average annual per capita energy usage in 27 of the larger
> industrialized countries is 227 million BTU.
>
> That's about 60% of the U.S. per capita energy usage.


So your goal is to have those energy guzzling Americans off-shore their energy
use by purchasing goods from.... oh let's say China (fueled by dirty coal
plants), so the bottom line US energy consumption "looks better on paper." Your
basic goal seems to be to avoid spending that dollar such that the energy
associated is expended somewhere other than the US. That way it will simply
look like material (mass) rather than energy. What a pointless interfering
exercise.

But to the extent the interfering policies *cause* economic inefficiencies, and
doubtless they will to some extent, economic activity will be slowed and permit
less energy usage due to lower wealth. Congratulations, you just made the world
poorer.

> (So they're maintaining equal quality of life and equivalent economies
> while using 60% the energy. So much for your argument.)


LOL.

> How do they manage to get by on only 60% of the energy the U.S. uses?
> Well, it doesn't take a genius to figure out that their tax
> structures, their economies, their land-use planning, and their
> cultures are set up to encourage, far more than the U.S. does, all the
> things that we ordinarily associate with "energy conservation":
> smaller dwellings,...


Gee, what were you saying about "equivalent" standards of living? The ability
to afford a larger dwelling -- and power it -- shows that someone is richer than
someone else. The same goes for the ability to afford and power a larger
vehicle. Someone is richer than someone else. So much for "equivalency." The
standards have a measure of *arbitrary value* and selectively chosen according
to political beliefs. That groupthink about "standards" may be common does not
presume its correctness.

> more compact land use, closer proximity of
> dwellings and destinations (ie, less "suburbia"), less use of the
> personal automobile and far greater percentages of walking, bicycling,
> and mass transit use, smaller and more efficient automobiles, less use
> of air conditioning and heating, and on and on and on.
>
> Not coincidentally, the average life span in many of these countries
> is longer than in the U.S.
>
> Returning to the original question--how much energy does bicycling
> save in the U.S.?


Ah, here we go again. One thing I learned in Thermodynamics was that you can
really make a "system" look very good if you are very selective about how you
draw the dotted line around the "system." Sure, we can lower US energy
consumption as a matter of policy. That would come at a cost of off-shoring
energy consumption (my "aggregate" argument) or by lowering economic activity
within the borders of the US (effectively lowering wealth -- try that one
politically).

Just note that I *never* wrote that energy consumption in the *US*, as a paper
(accounting) or real change, could not be lowered. What I have said is that it
would come at a cost. For the *global* energy consumption concern, there is
little point in drawing some arbitrary line around the US. It is particularly
foolish if policy simply shifts consumption to another local that produces the
energy with dirtier plants. The motor vehicles and plants (on a piecemeal
basis) in the US are among the "cleanest" in the world, if not the cleanest.
Pick your poison: Economic contraction or shifting burn locality or both. Make
it happen politically! Good luck. You might want to take Doctor Phil's advice
and "get real."

> This line of argument doesn't give a simple or definitive answer but
> it shows VERY clearly that countries that are otherwise similar to the
> U.S. but which have policies in place that encourage "conservation",
> including such measures as more walking, bicycling, and mass transit
> use, save a whole lot of energy as compared to the U.S. while
> maintaining similarly strong economies and high standards of living.
>
> --Brent
> bhugh [at] mwsc.edu
> www.MoBikeFed.org
>
> Notes:
>
> You can find total energy use and per capita use for the entire world,
> and for specific regions, and countries at
>
> http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/total.html
>
> The specific per capita energy use figures I noted above came from
> this Excel file:
>
> http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/tablee1c.xls
>
> World life expectancy figures:
>
> http://geography.about.com/library/weekly/aa042000b.htm



Amusing links, and thanks for them, but you are dodging the point. I'm all for
biking -- I wouldn't do it if I didn't value it. I suspect concentration of
funds for motor vehicles (and the roadways they travel over) has at least some
special interest distortions. If this distortion was removed, there might be
safer and better biking. I'm all for that.

But removing economic distortions (from special interests) won't save one joule
of energy. If anything, those distortions lower aggregate wealth in the world.
Once removed, aggregate wealth *goes up*. That means aggregate energy
consumption will *go up*! That is what has empirically happened thoughout human
history. This is an empirical fact and it is not going to change. Think of it
as the 2nd Law: you cannot win, you cannot break even, but you must play the
game.

By all means, ride your bike and advocate for safe and decent highways and
byways. But don't delude yourself about energy. Get real.
 
In article <[email protected]>,
gwhite <[email protected]> wrote:

>"B.B." wrote:
>>

>
>> You're omitting one really big element: indirect energy savings.

>
>I am not "omitting" anything. Sheesh!!! Why can't you guys address the
>*argument*, instead repeatedly ignoring it.


Well, when you kicked this thread off (well, your subthread of this
thread) you changed the question. Quote: "Indeed, I re-directed
immediately to the question of *energy in general*."
So I'm dealing with energy in general. OTOH, if your argument is
that no one person can make a difference on a global level, OK, I agree
somewhat--depending on your frame of reference.

>> So you can make the argument that the energy immediately saved...

>
>Whoa there. Sure, as a "time of habit change," there might be a *momentary*
>delay/lag -- no one is saying otherwise.
>
>But as the new habits are formed by the user, and their "expectations" become
>clear, those delays evaporate.
>
>The main crux proposed by conservationists is to lower the burn rate
>*permanently*. Unfortunately, the delays can only be temporary at best.


I have not seen you reason that out in this thread. You are stating
here that any reduction in individual energy consumption will be undone
without exception--that is not necessarily true. While I was riding
yesterday I wasn't running the radio, TV, or any lights--I won't somehow
increase my use of the TV later on to make up the difference.
That's why I brought up indirect energy savings--they do happen and
have an appreciable effect. If you choose to completely disregard them
your argument doesn't hold much water.

>> ... by
>> biking around wouldn't amount to squat at best, or even winds up getting
>> used elsewhere, but it's harder to disregard the secondary benefits.

>
>All other things equal, any secondary benefits do not amount to global
>conservation, even if local conservation is acheived. By all means, conserve
>locally: it is a good thing. Don't delude yourself into thinking you are
>conserving globally. You aren't.


OK. Is that your point? I thought you were arguing that energy
isn't actually conserved, not that the conservation doesn't matter. I
was going off this bit from <[email protected]>:

>Talk of "energy conservation" is often also associated with the concept of
>energy efficiency. That is, if some task is done with less energy consumption
>than it had previously required, then the process is considered to be more
>"energy efficient." Unfortunately, all evidence points to the fact that
>greater
>efficiency leads to greater energy consumption, an entirely non-intuitive
>result! (Maybe like wheels standing on spokes.)


The article you referenced in that post
<http://technology.open.ac.uk/eeru/staff/horace/kbpotl.htm> only applies
when you get to a pathological extreme of trying to increase efficiency.
Sort of like spending $4,000 extra dollars to shave another 20 grams off
a bike--an argument of diminishing returns. While it's valid I think
you're misapplying it. After all, Sheldon was just asking how much gas
is saved by cyclists--not proposing the outlaw of automobiles.
Also, as long as we're veering off towards economics--industries tend
toward energy efficiency all on their own as it leads to increased
profits. The trucking industry gets giddy over an extra 1/10 MPG in a
truck engine. Carnegie was so successful in part because he'd take the
time to examine efficiency.
Arguing that improvements on an individual level would hold if only
very few people were in question. However, there are quite a few
cyclists out there and a slight improvement averaged out over many of
them will be perceptible. At one point or another it'll come down to
your definition of "globally." If you define it sufficiently far out,
it's impossible for even the entire human race to make a difference.
OTOH, too small a definition would make a single rider matter too much
and be kind of useless.

--
B.B. --I am not a goat! thegoat4 at airmail.net
 
gwhite <[email protected]> wrote in
news:[email protected]:

>
>
> qtq wrote:
>>
>> gwhite <[email protected]> wrote in
>> news:[email protected]:
>>
>> > The empirical evidence shows
>> > that world energy consumption will grow, and always has as
>> > productivity grows. The macroeconomic argument helps shed light on
>> > why this is so, and helps us get real. Why not just think about it
>> > for awhile?

>> The obvious explanation for why world energy consumption grows as
>> productivity grows is that the extra energy is fueling the
>> productivity.

> Yes, exactly. And it will continue. The only way government
> intervention can really "do something" is to take a bite out of
> productivity (or contract the money supply), which more or less will
> mean recession/depression. This is not politically possible. As a
> note, it is also outside my "all other things equal" simplification.


That doesn't follow.

Labour productivity has been increasing through the application of
technology and energy - by having a machine harvest the grain, I have
exploited the IP in the harvester as well as the energy in its petroleum
to make one person (the driver) more productive than the army of people
who previously harvested the grain.

Energy productivity can increase through the application of technology in
the same way - by having a more efficient engine, the same harvester
(well, a very similar harvester which has a more efficient engine) can,
for the same labour and energy input, harvest more grain.

Government intervention can do several (among many) things:

1. It can drive the cost of energy up to the point where only highly
productive uses of energy are feasible. This is equivalent to setting
the minimum wage at a point where only semi-skilled or skilled workers
need enter the workforce. It can fail in the same way as labour market
regulation - in a globalised economy, industry can move to a place where
the energy (labour) cost is not artificially raised. It can succeed
because the higher cost of energy drives the development of more
productive uses for that energy.

2. It can directly invest in research and development of productivity
improvement for energy, just as it directly invests in productivity
improvement for labour.

--
to email me, run my email address through /usr/bin/caesar
(or rotate by -4)
 
"B.B." wrote:
>


> You are stating here that any reduction
> in individual energy consumption will be undone
> without exception...


No. What I said was "all other things equal" it won't change. You are correct
in thinking the problem is multi-dimensional, so as a didactic starting point, I
"stuck" things at equal. Obviously the issue has all sorts of complexity. For
one, different forms of energy in different places have different costs, and
even these will change with time. *No one* controls costs of all forms globally
and across every local; to think it can be done is an illusion.

I'm trying to get people to start thinking about what we face realistically
(macroeconomically), not "solve" intimate and complex details. That is pretty
much it. Of course there is no such thing as "all other things equal" in any
strict sense. But it is like those supply/demand curves in your econ text.
They are symbols to get you thinking about things in a certain way, not an
absolute and static truth. They could, more or less, be accurate models at some
given place and time. The idea's purpose to get one's feet on the ground in a
symbolic way, not to write a bible. We can't even ask the right questions if we
have no foundations (or at least we'll be lucky if we do).

> --that is not necessarily true. While I was riding
> yesterday I wasn't running the radio, TV, or any lights--I won't somehow
> increase my use of the TV later on to make up the difference.


So? Say you saved a buck on your energy bill. Are you going to stuff the buck
into the mattress? Some people might, but let's not let a few deviants corrupt
our thinking. What happens to the buck?

> That's why I brought up indirect energy savings--they do happen and
> have an appreciable effect. If you choose to completely disregard them
> your argument doesn't hold much water.


Just because you "saved" (conserved) some energy exactly where your butt is
sitting, doesn't mean it got saved (conserved) in the aggregate.

> >All other things equal, any secondary benefits do not amount to global
> >conservation, even if local conservation is acheived. By all means, conserve
> >locally: it is a good thing. Don't delude yourself into thinking you are
> >conserving globally. You aren't.

>
> OK. Is that your point?


Yes.

> I thought you were arguing that energy
> isn't actually conserved, ...


It is saved locally. It is not saved globally (aggregate), all other things
equal. "Something happens" to/with the buck you saved.

> ...not that the conservation doesn't matter.


As I've wrote, I think it is a good idea, but not because it saves in the
aggregate, which it does not, as a general concept.

> I was going off this bit from <[email protected]>:
>
> >Talk of "energy conservation" is often also associated with the concept of
> >energy efficiency. That is, if some task is done with less energy consumption
> >than it had previously required, then the process is considered to be more
> >"energy efficient." Unfortunately, all evidence points to the fact that
> >greater
> >efficiency leads to greater energy consumption, an entirely non-intuitive
> >result! (Maybe like wheels standing on spokes.)


In the aggregate, yes. Of course.

> The article you referenced in that post
> <http://technology.open.ac.uk/eeru/staff/horace/kbpotl.htm> only applies
> when you get to a pathological extreme of trying to increase efficiency.
> Sort of like spending $4,000 extra dollars to shave another 20 grams off
> a bike--an argument of diminishing returns. While it's valid I think
> you're misapplying it. After all, Sheldon was just asking how much gas
> is saved by cyclists--not proposing the outlaw of automobiles.


I have not argued (at all) that "gas" as a specific form of energy could not be
saved. As you noted, I changed to a more expansive topic immediately and made
it clear I was doing so. As you may have seen, I have argued that other forms
of energy are substitutes, or at least could be.

> Also, as long as we're veering off towards economics...


No one is veering off. We behave as economic creatures everyday, regardless if
we acknowledge we are doing so in any formal way. We make hundreds of decisions
daily about what is worth doing and what is not worth doing (for right or
wrong). Sure economics, as a field of study, gives this the formal name of
"opportunity cost," but it is what we do, not the nomenclature and symbolism of
a profession that is important.

> ...--industries tend
> toward energy efficiency all on their own as it leads to increased
> profits. The trucking industry gets giddy over an extra 1/10 MPG in a
> truck engine. Carnegie was so successful in part because he'd take the
> time to examine efficiency.


Yes, I like how you are thinking there. The crux here is that increased
efficiency by Carnegie, did not result in lower aggregate energy usage. Indeed,
the lower costs due to better efficiency effectively *increased* aggregate
wealth, which led to *more* energy usage (but not necessarily at Carnegie's
steel plant). It is a bitter pill to swallow if you truly hope for something
different. You can look it up.

> Arguing that improvements on an individual level would hold if only
> very few people were in question. However, there are quite a few
> cyclists out there and a slight improvement averaged out over many of
> them will be perceptible. At one point or another it'll come down to
> your definition of "globally."


Dude, how many definitions are there? If there is no cost to cycling (no
reduced productivity) then the aggregate energy use will not go down, all other
things equal. I fact, if there is zero productivity lost, then wealth is
effectively increased (because transportation utility is equally met, but more
efficiently), which will likely lead to increased usage "somewhere else" -- that
is exactly what has been happening since the dawn of time. If there is in fact
lost productivity, then it is possible that energy use could be reduced. So you
see, the only reasonable methodolgy for reducing energy use treads on the thin
ice of diminishing wealth. Politically that's a tough sell. However, if you
avoid telling people you don't want to diminish their wealth, but instead say
you are simply saving the world from overconsumption (whatever that is), then
the deception has a chance politically. Depression/recession will stall energy
use. Probably quite effectively.

There is no value judgement here regarding "rightness of choice." What is put
forward is there is a cost associated with decisions. A rather famous economist
borrowed a phrase (from Heinlein I believe) that "there is no such thing as a
free lunch." Those are very true words.

> If you define it sufficiently far out,
> it's impossible for even the entire human race to make a difference.


What "difference" are you hoping to acheive? It seems that the presumption is
that "energy usage is bad." It isn't. The richness of today's world is due in
the largest part to the energy we've harnessed. It is representative of our
wealth. It is what makes things move, in the figurative and literal sense.
We'd be living in caves and eating uncooked roots and liver if it wasn't for all
the energy. None of this says we shouldn't try to be more efficient, we
should. But costs alone will tend to drive us to do so, as you noted about a
couple of industries.

As I observe, I see the tendency of humans is pretty much to improve their lot
in life. What more "difference" could anyone reasonably care about?

> OTOH, too small a definition would make a single rider matter too much
> and be kind of useless.


This single rider is about to turn off to his house. This ride is about over.
 
qtq wrote:
>


> Labour productivity has been increasing through the application of
> technology and energy - by having a machine harvest the grain,...


What has precisely accompanied all industrialization and increasingly efficient
technology to date is *increasing* energy usage. This is the empirical fact.
Those folks that exited the fields and threw their scythes into the garbage
didn't just dissappear into thin air. They were employed in some other ways --
ways which *consume* energy and provided them with the functional wealth to
consume *more* energy.

Of course, if the government could just get everyone to sit still, like the good
nanny that it is.... LOL
 
In article <[email protected]>,
gwhite <[email protected]> wrote:

[...brevity snippage...]

>I'm trying to get people to start thinking about what we face realistically
>(macroeconomically), not "solve" intimate and complex details. That is pretty
>much it. Of course there is no such thing as "all other things equal" in any
>strict sense. But it is like those supply/demand curves in your econ text.
>They are symbols to get you thinking about things in a certain way, not an
>absolute and static truth. They could, more or less, be accurate models at
>some
>given place and time. The idea's purpose to get one's feet on the ground in a
>symbolic way, not to write a bible. We can't even ask the right questions if
>we
>have no foundations (or at least we'll be lucky if we do).


OK, I can stick with that.

>> --that is not necessarily true. While I was riding
>> yesterday I wasn't running the radio, TV, or any lights--I won't somehow
>> increase my use of the TV later on to make up the difference.

>
>So? Say you saved a buck on your energy bill. Are you going to stuff the
>buck
>into the mattress? Some people might, but let's not let a few deviants
>corrupt
>our thinking. What happens to the buck?


It's unknown what happens to the buck. I might go spend it on some
candy (probably a high energy investment) or I might spend it on a
stripper (low energy investment) or maybe a book (low energy investment
that also causes me to sit and not consume much energy while reading it
as a secondary form of conservation) or.... In any event, there's no
model available to predict where that dollar will go or what it'll cost
in terms of energy.
The best way to get a ball-park estimate is to look at
personality--folks who bike regularly tend to consciously or
sub-consciously conserve energy in other places as well.
So my best wild-assed guess at what happens to that buck--it will get
spent on something that has a fairly low energy consumption to produce
when compared to the average.

>> That's why I brought up indirect energy savings--they do happen and
>> have an appreciable effect. If you choose to completely disregard them
>> your argument doesn't hold much water.

>
>Just because you "saved" (conserved) some energy exactly where your butt is
>sitting, doesn't mean it got saved (conserved) in the aggregate.


Doesn't mean it'll get spent either. As I mentioned elsewhere,
conservation is often achieved by efficiency improvements. On the
aggregate an economy tends towards efficiency improvements simply
because it saves time and leaves more room for cheap fun stuff like sex.
The US economy is wildly wasteful of energy because it has been quite
cheap to become that way as a nice side-effect of a strong US economy--a
buck was worth a bunch of dinars, pesos, franks, yes, or whatever else.
It's becoming more expensive because the US's economy is crapping out.
When you have less buying power you can either keep spending at your
current rate and fall behind as a result, or cut back so you break even.
"Saving" energy in the US just means reducing your energy usage enough
that your expenditure (as a fraction of your wealth) on energy remains
constant over time. Nothing is really saved, just less is spent.
So, my best guess as to what happens to that buck I save on my
electric bill--it evaporates as the US economy shrinks and prices in
general inflate. That would leave me to believe that there won't be
much rebound energy usage if I conserve since my "saved" buck isn't
worth a buck anymore.

>> I thought you were arguing that energy
>> isn't actually conserved, ...

>
>It is saved locally. It is not saved globally (aggregate), all other things
>equal. "Something happens" to/with the buck you saved.
>
>> ...not that the conservation doesn't matter.

>
>As I've wrote, I think it is a good idea, but not because it saves in the
>aggregate, which it does not, as a general concept.


Well, I really don't see where you've made a firm proof that any
energy savings on a local level can't influence on the global level with
enough people involved.

>> I was going off this bit from <[email protected]>:
>>
>> >Talk of "energy conservation" is often also associated with the concept of
>> >energy efficiency. That is, if some task is done with less energy
>> >consumption
>> >than it had previously required, then the process is considered to be more
>> >"energy efficient." Unfortunately, all evidence points to the fact that
>> >greater
>> >efficiency leads to greater energy consumption, an entirely non-intuitive
>> >result! (Maybe like wheels standing on spokes.)

>
>In the aggregate, yes. Of course.
>
>> The article you referenced in that post
>> <http://technology.open.ac.uk/eeru/staff/horace/kbpotl.htm> only applies
>> when you get to a pathological extreme of trying to increase efficiency.
>> Sort of like spending $4,000 extra dollars to shave another 20 grams off
>> a bike--an argument of diminishing returns. While it's valid I think
>> you're misapplying it. After all, Sheldon was just asking how much gas
>> is saved by cyclists--not proposing the outlaw of automobiles.

>
>I have not argued (at all) that "gas" as a specific form of energy could not
>be
>saved. As you noted, I changed to a more expansive topic immediately and made
>it clear I was doing so. As you may have seen, I have argued that other forms
>of energy are substitutes, or at least could be.


Yeah, but my point with that paragraph was that the situation we're
discussing isn't building the sort of circumstances where the KB
(Khazzoom-Brookes) postulate applies. It's an incidental "what's the
net passive effect of this" question instead of a "what if we started
changing rules" question.
See, that really only applies when the conservation in question is in
the form of a reduction in quality of life rather than an increase in
efficiency that keeps quality of life constant.
IOW, KB doesn't prove that my saving a gallon of gas in Texas leads
to an extra gallon of gas worth of energy spent elsewhere. That may
actually happen, but KB doesn't support it.

>> Also, as long as we're veering off towards economics...

>
>No one is veering off. We behave as economic creatures everyday, regardless
>if
>we acknowledge we are doing so in any formal way. We make hundreds of
>decisions
>daily about what is worth doing and what is not worth doing (for right or
>wrong). Sure economics, as a field of study, gives this the formal name of
>"opportunity cost," but it is what we do, not the nomenclature and symbolism
>of
>a profession that is important.
>
>> ...--industries tend
>> toward energy efficiency all on their own as it leads to increased
>> profits. The trucking industry gets giddy over an extra 1/10 MPG in a
>> truck engine. Carnegie was so successful in part because he'd take the
>> time to examine efficiency.

>
>Yes, I like how you are thinking there. The crux here is that increased
>efficiency by Carnegie, did not result in lower aggregate energy usage.
>Indeed,
>the lower costs due to better efficiency effectively *increased* aggregate
>wealth, which led to *more* energy usage (but not necessarily at Carnegie's
>steel plant). It is a bitter pill to swallow if you truly hope for something
>different. You can look it up.


There really is no economic model that shows Carnegie's improved
efficiency promoted economic growth--more available steel did that, but
the same could have been accomplished with poor efficiency.
Now, an increase in efficiency CAN lead to economic stimulus, like
the improved refinement of aluminum made what was a precious metal into
a commodity--effectively creating a whole new market. However, that's
not really comparable to riding a bike to save a bit of gas.
In most cases increased efficiency is just a cost savings--either
taken home as extra pay, or left in the bank to absorb economic
downturns. You see this in truck fleet maintenance where shaving off a
few minutes per job, or increasing mileage slightly typically ends up as
a pay increase for the unions. What happens to that money when the
workers go home is mostly unknown. But any inflation will make a
certain percentage vanish--which is the case today.

>> Arguing that improvements on an individual level would hold if only
>> very few people were in question. However, there are quite a few
>> cyclists out there and a slight improvement averaged out over many of
>> them will be perceptible. At one point or another it'll come down to
>> your definition of "globally."

>
>Dude, how many definitions are there? If there is no cost to cycling (no
>reduced productivity) then the aggregate energy use will not go down, all
>other
>things equal. I fact, if there is zero productivity lost, then wealth is
>effectively increased (because transportation utility is equally met, but more
>efficiently), which will likely lead to increased usage "somewhere else" --
>that
>is exactly what has been happening since the dawn of time. If there is in
>fact
>lost productivity, then it is possible that energy use could be reduced. So
>you
>see, the only reasonable methodolgy for reducing energy use treads on the thin
>ice of diminishing wealth. Politically that's a tough sell. However, if you
>avoid telling people you don't want to diminish their wealth, but instead say
>you are simply saving the world from overconsumption (whatever that is), then
>the deception has a chance politically. Depression/recession will stall
>energy
>use. Probably quite effectively.
>
>There is no value judgement here regarding "rightness of choice." What is put
>forward is there is a cost associated with decisions. A rather famous
>economist
>borrowed a phrase (from Heinlein I believe) that "there is no such thing as a
>free lunch." Those are very true words.


True, there's no free lunch, but you can make a sandwich by
discarding the remainder of the loaf, or you can save that loaf and put
it to better use. Either way you still have a sandwich of equal
quality, but one is more cost-effective.

>> If you define it sufficiently far out,
>> it's impossible for even the entire human race to make a difference.

>
>What "difference" are you hoping to acheive? It seems that the presumption is
>that "energy usage is bad." It isn't.


Energy use by itself is not bad, but energy waste and the byproducts
of our current energy sources are bad. When I talk about reducing
energy consumption, I refer to the "waste" portion of it. Compare
cars--modern car engines produce more power, need less maintenance, and
have far better fuel economy than engines of 20 years ago. Waste has
been greatly reduced and quality didn't suffer--in fact it managed to
increase at the same time.
And as other have pointed out, there is not a direct correlation
between more energy used and better life. Evidence such as someone's
mention of life span and energy consumption in Europe. You mentioned
that their homes are smaller, but that's a value judgment since some
people are perfectly happy with small homes or apartments.

>The richness of today's world is due
>in
>the largest part to the energy we've harnessed. It is representative of our
>wealth. It is what makes things move, in the figurative and literal sense.
>We'd be living in caves and eating uncooked roots and liver if it wasn't for
>all
>the energy. None of this says we shouldn't try to be more efficient, we
>should. But costs alone will tend to drive us to do so, as you noted about a
>couple of industries.
>
>As I observe, I see the tendency of humans is pretty much to improve their lot
>in life. What more "difference" could anyone reasonably care about?


I believe we're thinking of the same "difference" but different ways
of achieving it. I think we can reduce energy consumption without
changing quality of life, but you appear to draw a direct correlation
between quality of life and energy consumption.

>> OTOH, too small a definition would make a single rider matter too much
>> and be kind of useless.

>
>This single rider is about to turn off to his house. This ride is about over.


--
B.B. --I am not a goat! thegoat4 at airmail.net
 
gwhite wrote:

>Jack Dingler wrote:
>
>
>>gwhite wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>>Jack Dingler wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>As these sources are either unknown or merely unrealized projections of
>>>>established theory, I would think the onus on the proof would be on
>>>>those that insist these supplies are available, when we are not
>>>>currently tapping them.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>You were already provided a link regarding actual breeder reactors. You were
>>>already provided a link regarding existing and under construction conventional
>>>nukes.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>

>>You didn't make your case that a rapid ramping up to the numbers needed
>>is practical or possible. You agreed that the political climate is
>>difficult. I find such admissions to be supportive of my arguments, not
>>yours.
>>
>>

>
>I think you have a static view of the world. Political views and technology
>change over time. They particularly change when the costs become more apparent
>which is perhaps another way of saying "more painful." I mean cost in a very
>broad sense, although it probably will come right down to dollars in some way.
>
>I don't really need to cover any "rapid ramping" argument. *You* are the one
>claiming this, with no specifics whatsoever.
>
>
>
>>>>Remember also, that it's not only the quantity of untapped reserves that
>>>>is important but more importantly, the rate they can become available
>>>>that is important. The case has not been made that these sources will be
>>>>ramped up to cover the imminent shortfall in oil production.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>They won't when and where coal and other sources of energy are cheaper. They'll
>>>get ramped up quicker if the costs of other forms become more expensive. This
>>>is a simple subsitution effect. I don't get your problem.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>

>>Once oil, coal and natural gas become more expensive, where will the
>>energy come from to make the materials to build the nukes? If the
>>materials needed to make the nukes become more expensive (and they are
>>now), won't construction of the nukes become more expensive? And doesn't
>>this effect the bottom line, meaning that as the price of energy goes
>>up, so does the difficulty in investing in nukes?
>>
>>Consider also that most of the stages of uranium mining and processing
>>is highly dependent on oil and natural gas. Though in theory, these
>>steps could be performed with the electricity from nukes, such an
>>infrastructure doesn't exist now. In fact, it will require a substantial
>>investment to build new facilities and convert existing ones.
>>
>>

>
>You are really going off on a tangent. To the extent costs of energy go up,
>economic activity and growth will slow, stall, etc. I suspect that most people
>won't favor that. Sure, it might be "cheaper" in some sense to build nukes
>today rather than tommorrow. It might be smart, maybe not. I don't know and am
>not even attempting to make that sort of judgement. I said I believe increasing
>use will be made of nuclear energy. Nothing you said changes that. You are
>only making vague statements about difficilties. So what? Sure it's
>"difficult." If you compared today's highway system or power grid to that which
>existed 100 years ago, you'd (100 years ago) say "gee, building all that 'stuff'
>is going to be hard." No ****. Life is hard, it always has been.
>
>

Actually building that stuff is relatively easy in an industrial climate
where energy supplies are growing.

It takes a lot of natural gas to make the lime to produce that much
concrete.

In terms of cheaper, what I am arguing is that taking these huge chunks
of energy and labor out of the current industrial market would be
something we may be able to recover from at this time. Later it may be
impossible to do this because the energy decline will make the political
climate for such sacrifices harder. Once we go into decline diverting
that much natural gas, oil and coal from life sustaining activities will
mean throwing more people of work and raising food prices.

Check this article out:
http://www.bday.co.za/bday/content/direct/1,3523,1721058-6078-0,00.html

This focus on Africa as one of the last great places to drill for oil,
tells me that the oil companies have given up on the big fields and are
now looking for sofa pickings and ever smaller and more difficult
prospects to keep themselves in business. Look at the amount of money
they plan to invest to get a mere one million barrels a day out. These
fields, producing a fraction of the quantity of their declining bigger
brothers are now the cream of the crop.

And a final note on this argument.
The pat argument has always been that when oil reaches some dollar value
$20, $25, $30, $35, $40, $45, $50, $55, $60, $65, ..., the alternative
energy sources will be competitive. As these alternatives are supported
by fossil fuels, this argument has a flaw. The fact that oil is now at
$50/barrel and yet these still can't be made profitable enough for huge
investments, tell that they never will be suitable for a mass expansion
and use as primary energy sources. They'll continue to provide a limited
solution.

So far, I don't think I've been vague. Every industrial operation
requires some amount of energy to do work. Energy is accountable and we
capture and convert a measurable quantity of it every year. Where money
is intangible and can the quantities can be changed by simply writing
different numbers or running up a deficit, energy is a physical item
that works by rules that we can't cheat. All of our technology has been
in a drive to consume energy to sustain ourselves and build our numbers.
Once you start in the argument of waiting until there's an energy
decline and thus a decline in the world's ability to support it's human
population, you're in fact arguing that it will even be possible to
trade lives and economies in exchange for building nukes. Even arguing
that it's reasonable to do so.

I agree it will be hard. As everything in our modern lives depends on
virtually unlimited cheap energy, I believe it's going to be a lot
harder than you think it will be. By arguing to wait until we're in a
decline before investing nukes, you're making a recovery from this
situation even more difficult. It could take more than a generation on a
declining energy budget to begin to turn that decline around.

>>I thought I was clear. It means we need these investments start soon so
>>they can go into production soon.
>>
>>

>
>There has already *been* investment. There *is* investment. I not clear on why
>you want to ignore it, and you aren't calling it out. If you have an agenda,
>just say so.
>
>

Sure, Texas has a number of nukes, France has nukes. But you're
confusing the investment I argued that we need with investments made.
I'm arguing that we need to be investing a tremendous sum of energy and
resources, far beyond the investments that are being made now. I call it
too little too late.

>>>>Nukes for instance need to demonstrate a lot of scaleability right now.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>Umm, they already have. Look at France. I think we have over 200 nukes here
>>>right now (20% of energy), and that is with no new plants built in over 20
>>>years.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>

>>20% of the electricity, but only 6.3% of the total energy. You've argued
>>that nukes will replace oil. This means that nukes will power the
>>current uses that oil current powers including long haul trucking and
>>freighters.
>>
>>

>
>Yeah, so what? What makes you think that transportation tommorrow will "look
>like" transportation today? Where does this static world view come from?
>Gas/diesel trucks obsoleted horse and cart. Hay are horses are gone. Diesel
>trucks will probably dissappear someday. Sure, the machine and the energy will
>match. What's the big deal?
>
>We don't use gas/oil lamps anymore either. They were "good" for awhile though.
>
>

If we don't build nukes until world oil production hit's the 4% / year
decline, then these current systems will be breaking down. Without
transportation systems, how will you build your nukes, to power the
development of a new paradigm in transportation? And a likely less
efficient one at that?

Perhaps the lime for concrete can be made in the fashion the Romans did
it? Big bonfires of hardwood forests and lot's of labor with shovels and
earth? Then the concrete and water could be trucked to the sites using
mule teams and wagons? At least the wagons could be build using parts
scavenged from junkyards.

My view of the world isn't static at all unfortunately. But I think
you're trying to cling to an idea as a matter of faith, not as a matter
of reason. You've argued that there's a lot about this topic you don't
know. Perhaps that's something you can look into and come back to this
discussion with?

>>You're only looking at a slim sliver of the overall picture. Oil is
>>hardly even a component in the total electricity picture.
>>
>>

>
>Well that only makes oil *less* important, not more.
>
>


Oil makes up the dominant source of energy that we consume. Only by
wrongly assuming that electricity has a civilization sustaining capacity
that trumps all other sources can you make this argument.

Electricity is likely the most visible component in our daily lives, but
transportation driven by oil makes the need for electricity possible.

>>Your argument is that nukes can take over most
>>electricity production and expand to
>>replace oil and coal.
>>
>>

>
>Well they certainly could, at least technically in the raw output sense. Nukes
>need to compete on price though. I don't see much purpose in overinvestment any
>more than I would pay $1500 for a bike where I could get a $1200 bike that met
>my needs just as well. If there is "forward looking" that makes the $1500
>dollar bike look better, maybe I'll consider. As ever, "it depends," just like
>any assessment.
>
>

No, they need to compete on the basis of Energy Returned on Energy
Invested. Money is an invention who's value is not based on any physical
quantity. In fact it has a declining value over time. Each barrel of oil
has a fixed BTU content. The quantity of work that can be derived from a
barrel of oil is relatively fixed. Efficiency place some role, but not a
huge one. Therefore as the price of oil continues to rise, the quantity
of dollars needed to purchase a fixed quantity of work, keeps rising.
Meaning the price of building a nuke plant keeps rising.

What is more important is the quantity of energy needed to build the
nuke, what percentage of our available BTUs this will consume and then
the ratio of energy returned over these quantities.

Oil is 'cheap' as an energy source because it once required a very small
investment in energy to get big returns. In the 1930s in Texas, using
mule teams and human labor, you could drill a well, lay down pipe and
pump oil. The oil kept flowing under positive pressure and only
maintenance work need be performed to keep large quantities of oil
moving through the pipes. The EROEI was likely better than 50 to 1. Now
typical new oil fields are under 5 to 1, representing the increased
investment in energy and materials needed to get the oil out. Fields no
longer are under positive pressure, so sea water has to be pumped in to
push the oil out. Then the oil comes up mixed with sea water and an
additional amount of energy has to be invested to separate the oil from
the sea water.

Where nukes are in the EROEI scale is in debate. I've seen several
studies that give us figures from 2 to 1 up to 5 to 1. As the work to
produce these numbers isn't published, who knows which answer is correct?

>>>>Consider that nukes produce only about 6.3% of the world's total energy
>>>>(not electricity), and that's with about 440 operating nukes. This means
>>>>that to rely on nukes for only our current power needs, we'd need 6984
>>>>of them. This ignore the fact that a growing population and capitalism
>>>>requires growth. Once oil goes into it's expect 3% per year decline, we
>>>>need to have have a program already in place building approximately 350
>>>>of them a year, worldwide. I'd like to see you meet the burden of proof
>>>>demonstrating that this is likely.
 
qtq wrote:

>gwhite <[email protected]> wrote in
>news:[email protected]:
>
>
>
>>qtq wrote:
>>
>>
>>>gwhite <[email protected]> wrote in
>>>news:[email protected]:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>The empirical evidence shows
>>>>that world energy consumption will grow, and always has as
>>>>productivity grows. The macroeconomic argument helps shed light on
>>>>why this is so, and helps us get real. Why not just think about it
>>>>for awhile?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>The obvious explanation for why world energy consumption grows as
>>>productivity grows is that the extra energy is fueling the
>>>productivity.
>>>
>>>

>>Yes, exactly. And it will continue. The only way government
>>intervention can really "do something" is to take a bite out of
>>productivity (or contract the money supply), which more or less will
>>mean recession/depression. This is not politically possible. As a
>>note, it is also outside my "all other things equal" simplification.
>>
>>

>
>That doesn't follow.
>
>Labor productivity has been increasing through the application of
>technology and energy - by having a machine harvest the grain, I have
>exploited the IP in the harvester as well as the energy in its petroleum
>to make one person (the driver) more productive than the army of people
>who previously harvested the grain.
>
>Energy productivity can increase through the application of technology in
>the same way - by having a more efficient engine, the same harvester
>(well, a very similar harvester which has a more efficient engine) can,
>for the same labour and energy input, harvest more grain.
>
>Government intervention can do several (among many) things:
>
>1. It can drive the cost of energy up to the point where only highly
>productive uses of energy are feasible. This is equivalent to setting
>the minimum wage at a point where only semi-skilled or skilled workers
>need enter the workforce. It can fail in the same way as labour market
>regulation - in a globalised economy, industry can move to a place where
>the energy (labour) cost is not artificially raised. It can succeed
>because the higher cost of energy drives the development of more
>productive uses for that energy.
>
>2. It can directly invest in research and development of productivity
>improvement for energy, just as it directly invests in productivity
>improvement for labour.
>
>


Your answers are partially correct.

1. We've gone from investing one calorie of energy invested to get ten
calories back, to using fossil fuels to investing ten calories of energy
to get one calorie back. Technology has increased the scale at which we
can do things, but only by consuming orders of magnitude more energy
than we used to require. And in doing so, we've degraded the quality of
soil and water, making a return to a one to ten relationship likely
impossible on a large scale.
2. Efficiency isn't the measure of our ability to use 100% energy of the
energy available to convert to 100% work, but instead is how close we
come to a theoretical limit in how much work we get from the energy. So
big changes in efficiency can mean very small changes in actual energy
consumption.
3. A fixed quantity of energy provides us with a relatively fixed
quantity of work. A barrel of oil for instance provides a fixed BTU
quantity, which provides a relatively fixed quantity of work. So the
rising price of a barrel of oil represents that fact that purchasing the
same fixed quantity of work is becoming ever more expensive. A drop in
oil production and consumption will mean that there is a declining
quantity of work available to a rising population.

Making cars more fuel efficient is one argument proposed to solve our
energy problem. But the quantity of fuel saved will only delay the peak
in world oil production by months or a few years. As has been pointed
out, cars are much more efficient than they were in the 1970s. But
thanks to Jevon's Paradox, we just became more dependent on them and
drove consumption up along the predicted path anyway.


Jack Dingler
 
gwhite wrote:

> ...
> Actually, the private firms that own the plants (and their customers) can pay
> the costs themselves. The spent fuel rods are a problem because radioactivity
> is so hazardous. The government *wants* the waste because it is, for one thing,
> a national security issue. I have no problem of the users paying the cost of
> the federal storage. Yes, nukes should compete based on actual costs. Nuke
> costs may be higher, or may appear to be so, depending upon how costs are
> accounted for....


Mr. White,

As a libertarian, do you agree that Price-Anderson should be revoked and
nuclear power generators should cover their full liability by purchasing
insurance on the open market?

--
Tom Sherman